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THE FULL REALIZATION OF OUR
RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Cynthia Soohoot & Jordan Goldberg*
State constitutions . . . are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal
revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not
be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state
law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot
be guaranteed.
-Justice William J. Brennan'
It is arguable that [the] debate has been resolved, namely
whether economic, social and cultural rights can be denied
the status of human rights on the basis that they are not
judicially enforceable-there is now too much evidence to the
contrary.
-Malcolm Langford2
t Director of the U.S. Legal Program at the Center for Reproductive Rights.
* State Advocacy Counsel in the U.S. Legal Program at the Center for Reproductive
Rights. We would like to thank Bonnie Scott Jones, for helping conceptualize this Article, and
Professor Jessie Hill, for her valuable comments. We would also like to thank our interns,
Katherine Greenier, Emma Neff, Ernesto Velizquez, Jean Zachariasiewicz, for their research
assistance.
I William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
2 Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory, in
SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW 3, 4 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008) (footnote omitted).
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INTRODUCTION
Although the U.S. legal community has historically viewed
socio-economic rights with skepticism, there is substantial
popular support for these rights. Eighty-two percent of Americans
strongly believe that there should be "equal access to quality
public education" and seventy-two percent of Americans strongly
believe that health care should be considered a human right.3
Many Americans are surprised to hear that these rights have not
been recognized as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,4 but they
need look no further than state constitutions to find them. All
state constitutions contain provisions for public education,
and almost a third of state constitutions reference public health.6
Despite inclusion in a surprising number of state constitutions, with
the exception of cases grappling with state constitutional rights
to education, state socio-economic rights provisions remain
dramatically under-enforced. In contrast, outside of the United
States, there are a growing number of cases in which courts are
enforcing socio-economic rights provisions. This Article focuses
on reproductive health law and policy as an area in which state
governments have both failed to affirmatively promote the right to
health and improperly imposed barriers to prevent women from
accessing reproductive health care, both potentially in violation of
their own state constitutional obligations. Further, it considers
how courts seeking to enforce right-to-health provisions in state
constitutions could benefit from examining the comparative
experiences of state courts and the high courts of other countries
that have enforced similar socio-economic rights provisions.
The failure of state courts to enforce socio-economic rights
provisions can be traced a reluctance to enforce state constitutional
3 THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE U.S. 54 (2007), available
at http://opportunityagenda.org/files/field-file/Human%2Rights%2Report%20-% 2 02 0 0 7 %2 0
public%20opinion.pdf.
4 This Article addresses the potential for enforcing social and economic rights that are
contained in some state constitutions and does not address whether the United States
Constitution should be interpreted as protecting similar rights. However, several scholars have
raised whether the United States Constitution should be interpreted, or has implicitly been
interpreted, to contain such guarantees. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American
Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 5 (2005)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Social and Economic Guarantees]; B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as
Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 503 (2009).
5 See Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the Notion
of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5 (2010).
6 See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12
U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 3), available at http://works.bepress
.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= 1002&context=elizabeth-weeks.
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rights where there is no clear federal analogue. State courts have also
expressed concern that enforcement of socio-economic rights would
improperly entangle courts in political questions that are better left
to the political branches. The prioritization of civil and political
rights (which generally coincide with our federal constitutional rights)
over socio-economic rights and the perception that socio-economic
rights are unenforceable reflect broader historical attitudes about
socio-economic rights.
Despite full recognition of socio-economic rights in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,7 the "post-World War II
human rights architecture gave short shrift" to their enforcement.
Legal scholars and commentators associated "civil and political"
rights with restraints on government action and "socio-economic"
rights with prescriptions for government action.9 Based on this
distinction, civil and political rights were deemed a proper subject
for judicial intervention, and socio-economic rights were viewed
as unenforceable.10 Internationally, however, this perception of
socio-economic rights is rapidly changing.
Over the past two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in
socio-economic rights cases around the world." These cases have
begun to establish a methodology for enforcing socio-economic
rights. Courts have recognized that governments have a negative
obligation to respect socio-economic rights and have developed
criteria for determining whether governments are fulfilling
affirmative duties to progressively realize rights.'2 Interpreting a
newly minted post-apartheid constitution that explicitly and
unequivocally endorses socio-economic rights,13 the South African
Constitutional Court has emerged as a leader in this developing
7 G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec.
12, 1948).
8 Langford, supra note 2, at 7.
9 See Brian Ray, Policentrism, Political Mobilization, and the Promise of Socioeconomic
Rights, 45 STAN. J. INT'L LAW 151, 151 (2009); Sunstein, Social and Economic Guarantees,
supra note 4, at 5.
10 See Michael J. Dennis & David P Steward, Justiciability of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the
Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 465 (2004) ("From the
outset, and for good reason, economic, social and cultural rights, unlike civil and political rights,
have been defined primarily as aspirational goals to be achieved progressively.").
1 A recent book edited by Malcolm Langford includes "almost two thousand judicial and
quasi-judicial decisions from twenty-nine national and international jurisdictions." Langford,
supra note 2, at 3.
12 Id. at 14-17 (describing cases involving state interference with socio-economic
rights); id. at 22-24 (describing cases concerning the state obligation to progressively realize
socio-economic rights).
'3 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2 (bill of rights).
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jurisprudence. 14 Its cases address many of the conceptual criticisms
that have plagued socio-economic rights enforcement, including
concerns about separation of powers, institutional competence and
judicial enforcement.15
In addition to the conceptual challenge of changing attitudes about
socio-economic rights, state courts seeking to enforce these
provisions face a practical challenge of developing the appropriate
standard of judicial review. It is common practice for state courts to
look to federal courts for guidance in enforcing state constitutional
rights.16 However, the lack of socio-economic rights provisions in the
federal Constitution leaves state courts with the choice of adopting
the federal rational basis review standard, declining to enforce the
socio-economic provisions, or striking out on their own. Given the
textual differences between the state and federal Constitutions,
we argue that developing distinct state socio-economic rights
jurisprudence is the most appropriate choice.
State constitutions are very different from the federal Constitution.
They have different histories and framers and grant a broader scope of
power to state governments. State constitutions often reflect different,
more local values than the federal Constitution and may have been
influenced by different political ideas when they were drafted and
amended. Although our contemporary understanding of the federal
Constitution has evolved over time, the U.S. Constitution is the oldest
federal constitution in existence.' 7 Dating back to 1787, it was written
long before the progressive social movements of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, as well as the international human
rights movement in the 1940s. While some state constitutions predate
the federal Constitution, others were drafted as late as 1968, and
14 See Philip Alston, Foreword to SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at ix, ix
(discussing the dominance of the South African Constitutional Court in the field of comparative
constitutional law).
11 See id.
16 See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 295 Conn. 1, 988 A.2d 276 (Conn. 2010) (noting that
"[t]he protection afforded against double jeopardy under the Connecticut constitution 'mirrors,
rather than exceeds,' that which is provided by the constitution of the United States" despite
lack of parallel language (quoting State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510 (Conn. 2005))); Adaway v.
State, 902 So. 2d 746, 752 (Fla. 2005) (holding that while language of Florida Constitution's
provision prohibiting "cruel and unusual punishment" was arguably broader than federal
constitution, there was no need to go further than the federal analysis in this case); State v.
Johnson, 316 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo. App. 2010) ("While the Missouri Constitution may extend
protections farther than those provided by the United States Constitution, such is not the case
with respect to searches and seizures, for article L section 15 of the Missouri Constitution is
parallel to and co-extensive with the Fourth Amendment.").
17 Constitution of the United States: Main Page, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/
index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
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many have been amended multiple times.' 8 Some states even drafted
their constitutions in the shadow of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and looked to the declaration for guidance and
inspiration.1 9
Given these differences, the explicit inclusion of socio-economic
rights in some state constitutions, and the lack of federal analogue for
these rights, state courts interpreting these types of provisions need to
look beyond federal models for enforcing state constitutional rights.
Some state courts have made significant progress in this area,
particularly in the enforcement of state right-to-education provisions.
However, state courts struggling to interpret and enforce these
provisions could find the burgeoning global jurisprudence concerning
enforcement of socio-economic rights instructive.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I looks at the historic
division between civil and political and socio-economic rights and the
criticisms of socio-economic rights that have led some legal scholars
to declare them unenforceable. It considers more recent scholarship
suggesting that all rights have negative and positive aspects, and
looks to international human rights law, which implicitly recognizes
the negative and positive aspects of all rights and conceptualizes them
in a different and perhaps more helpful way. Rather than categorizing
rights as positive or negative, human rights law recognizes that all
rights impose three categories of obligations on governments-the
obligations to protect, respect and ensure.20 Part I also challenges
claims that judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is improper
because courts do not have the political legitimacy or the institutional
competence to engage in "policy making." These criticisms reflect a
misplaced skepticism about socio-economic rights and an assumption
that judicial enforcement will always require the court to wade
deep into policy making. Further, such criticism ignores the potential
for judicial enforcement of negative obligations, as well as the
development of a standard of review that incorporates appropriate
deference to the political branches and allows for dialogue with
courts. In the U.S. context in particular, these criticisms fail to
account for the palpable differences between state and federal
constitutions and courts.
Part H reviews the recent socio-economic rights cases in South
Africa to better understand how the South African Constitutional
Court conceptualizes and enforces these rights. South Africa has
' See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
20 Sarah H. Cleveland, Essay, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 283 (2010).
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recognized that socio-economic rights consist of a negative obligation
to be free from government deprivations of, or undue interference
with, socio-economic rights, as well as a positive obligation to
ensure fundamental rights. The affirmative obligation does not create
individual enforceable rights, but requires that the government
develop a reasonable policy to meet societal needs. This obligation is
subject to the limits of reasonableness and available resources, and it
may be progressively realized. The Court's decisions reflect a careful
balancing of pragmatic concerns about institutional competency,
separation of powers, and the ability to enforce judicial orders with
the Court's responsibility to ensure that the political branches
meaningfully implement their constitutional duty to respect, protect,
and ensure socio-economic rights.
In contrast, some state courts in the United States have declined to
enforce unique constitutional rights, holding that socio-economic
rights provisions are unenforceable and that such issues are better
left to the legislative branch. Others have actively wrestled with
socio-economic rights. Part III discusses the differences between
state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution and the ways in which
those constitutions can be interpreted to better protect these rights.
It considers why these differences may make it inappropriate
for states to apply federal standards of review to enforce state
constitutional provisions. Differences in constitutional scope,
purpose, and historical context require that state courts develop
their own jurisprudence for enforcing state constitutional rights.
Such independent jurisprudential development by state courts is
particularly appropriate for socio-economic rights provisions that
have no federal analogue.
Part III also looks at state right-to-education cases to analyze how
courts have dealt with many of the same issues tackled by the South
African Constitutional Court, including judicial competence,
separation of powers, and enforceability of court orders. One barrier
that state courts seeking to enforce socio-economic rights may face is
the lack of domestic experience with socio-economic rights. This Part
argues that while state courts are not bound by judicial decisions from
other countries, they do have to enforce the constitutional rights
provided in their own constitutions and could benefit from looking to
decisions of the South African Constitutional Court and other nations'
high courts that recognize and interpret socio-economic rights.
Finally, Part IV considers how state education cases and the
experience of the South African Constitutional Court can help
develop a theory to enforce right-to-health provisions in state
1002 [Vol. 60:4
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constitutions. This Part argues that government interference with a
women's ability to make reproductive health decisions and to act to
protect her health may violate the right to health under state
constitutions. It also considers whether states violate their affirmative
obligation under state right-to-health provisions when they fail to
adopt reasonable policies designed to ensure that women have access
to reproductive health services.
I. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
A. The Historic Division Between Rights
Popular legal discourse often separates rights into two categories:
civil and political rights and socio-economic rights. Civil and political
rights are generally described as including the rights to liberty, free
speech, free exercise of religion, freedom from torture and fair trial.2 1
Socio-economic rights generally refer to rights to food, shelter,
education, and healthcare.22 Internationally, this dichotomy was
reinforced when political pressure and Cold War posturing resulted in
the division of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights into two separate human rights treaties: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)23 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). 24 The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992.25 It has
signed, but not ratified the ICESCR.26
As a general principle, human rights law recognizes the
indivisibility and interdependence of the rights contained in the
two covenants, which are jointly referred to as the International Bill
21 Mary Robinson, A Human Rights Challenge: Advancing Economic, Social & Cultural
Rights, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1059, 1060 (2005).
22 Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 351, 352 n. 1(2008).
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
24 International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; see also
Hope Lewis, "New" Human Rights: U.S. Ambivalence Toward the International Economic and
Social Rights Framework, in 1 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME 103, 119-21 (Cynthia Soohoo,
Catherine Albisa & Martha F. Davis eds., 2008) (describing the influence of Cold War politics
on the drafting and adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR).
25 United Nations Treaties Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno-IV-4&chapter
=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
26 United Nations Treaties Collection, International Covenant on Social, Economic and
Political Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no-IV-3
&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
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of Rights.27 Although no formal hierarchy was assigned to the
covenants, in the years following their ratification, the rights
contained in the ICESCR were often given a second-class status.
This was reflected in common references to civil political rights as
"first generation" rights, which constitute the "basic requisites of
civil and democratic society,"28 and socio-economic rights as "second
generation" rights," with the implied assumption that they came
later in both time and priority.29 Contemporaneous human rights
documents and mechanisms reinforced this status. Norwegian human
rights scholar Malcolm Langford has written that "[t]he post-World
War II human rights architecture gave short shrift to the enforcement
of social rights," pointing out that that individual complaints
concerning violations could only be made under the ICCPR and not
the ICESCR.30 This division was also reflected in constitutions
written after World War II, where socio-economic rights provisions
were often drafted as directive principles rather than enforceable
rights."
Today, most countries recognize the fundamental nature of the
rights protected by both the ICESCR and the ICCPR. One hundred
and sixty nations are parties to the ICESCR.32 One hundred and
sixty-five are parties to the ICCPR.33 The United States is one of the
few countries that have failed to ratify the ICESCR. The constitutions
of 187 countries contain rights to education and health care,34 and
thousands of cases have adjudicated socio-economic rights.35
27 See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Fact Sheet No.2
(Rev.1): The International Bill of Human Rights (1996), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.len.pdf.
28 John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2009).
29 See James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and
Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 125, 174-75 (2009).
30 Langford, supra note 2, at 7. In December of 2008, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
the Optional Protocol to the CESCR that would create an individual complaint mechanism,
which gives the CESCR committee authority to receive individual communications. G.A. Res.
63/117, U.N. Doc. AIRES/63/l 17 (Dec. 10, 2008).
31 Langford, supra note 2, at 7.
32 United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=l&
mtdsg.no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (listing the signatories to the
ICESCR).
33 United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid= 1&mtdsgno=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (listing the signatories to the ICCPR).
34 Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks, Introduction: The Elements of Legalization and the
Triangular Shape of Social and Economic Rights, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, I (Varun
Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008).
35 See Langford, supra note 2, at 3.
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Despite the widespread ratification of these treaties, however, the
view that socio-economic rights and civil and political rights are
fundamentally different persists and is reflected in critiques that
conflate socio-econornic rights with positive rights. The next section
argues that these critiques reflect a false distinction between
socio-economic and civil and political rights. In particular, they fail
to recognize that socio-economic rights often have negative aspects
and that respecting civil and political rights often requires significant
government action and expenditures.
B. The False Distinction Between Rights
Although contested socio-economic rights claims may more
frequently involve decisions about social policy, it is important to
understand that not all socio-economic rights claims are positive
rights claims. Distinctions between civil and political rights and
socio-economic rights should be understood as "historical and
descriptive rather than inherent and normative." 36 As such, courts
should not reject all socio-economic rights claims based on the
assumption that they will always require judicial involvement in
social policy or greater expenditure than claims involving civil and
political rights. Further, arguments that economic and social rights
claims involving affirmative government obligations are inherently
unenforceable need to be reconsidered in light of the developing
jurisprudence from other countries and from U.S. state courts that
illustrates the justiciability of affirmative socio-economic rights.
In the United States, legal and popular understandings of rights
stem from the United States Constitution, which is often described as
a Constitution of limited, enumerated powers. This means that
Congress, the President, and the courts have been granted certain
specific powers by the Constitution, and that all other actions are
beyond their collective powers. The Bill of Rights, which lays out the
shared rights of all individuals in the United States, has been
described as granting only negative civil and political rights. These
rights are commonly understood to give individuals protections
against government invasions of their rights as opposed to requiring
that the government provide them with any specific benefits or
protections. A prime example of this type of negative right is the
36 Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and
the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 321, 343 (2007). See
generally Sunstein, Social and Economic Guarantees, supra note 4.
3 See Helen Hershkoff, "Just Words:" Common lw and the Enforcement of State
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1521, 1523 (2010) (noting that
the federal Constitution "consistently has been interpreted as excluding affirmative claims to
2010] 1005
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right against government seizure of property without due process of
law and just compensation.
Despite the historical perception that the U.S. Constitution only
grants negative rights, scholars in recent years have questioned both
the distinction between negative and positive rights and the accuracy
of characterizing all individual rights in the United States as civil,
political, and negative. 0 Cass Sunstein, a prominent constitutional
scholar, has challenged the accuracy of characterizing federal
constitutional rights as negative rights, pointing out that the rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution "cannot exist without public
assistance."41 Protecting property and contract rights, free speech,
and religious liberty all require the expenditure of funds.42 He has
also argued that the federal Constitution need not be read to exclude
socio-economic rights because "the meaning of the Constitution
changes over time."43 Indeed, many different rights have been read
into the Constitution, including, for example, a ban against sex
discrimination that is not present in the text."
Other scholars have made similar arguments.4 5 Professor David
Currie, for example, has taken issue with the idea that the U.S.
government assistance").
38 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (barring deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of the law and just compensation).
3 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 4, at 503 ("The United States Constitution is usually
understood to confer only negative rights; this understanding is largely based on a perception
that negative rights fit best within the paradigm of classical liberalism, that they are more easily
enforceable by courts than positive rights, and that their recognition does not generally have
major budgetary implications. Consequently, the judicial enforcement of negative rights does
not raise the separation of powers concerns that might be raised by court-ordered rearrangement
of legislative priorities and substantial monetary outlays to provide certain goods to the
public."); see also Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 245 n.235 (2008) ("The United States Constitution is traditionally
characterized as a charter of negative, not positive liberties.").
4 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271,
2311-12 (1990) (arguing that the constitutional text as a whole does not support the notion that
it was solely made up of negative rights); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864, 873 (1986) (observing that the right to counsel imposes an
affirmative duty on the government to provide counsel if a defendant cannot afford it); Sunstein,
Social and Economic Guarantees, supra note 4, at 6 ("Most of the so-called negative rights
require governmental assistance, not governmental abstinence.").
41 Sunstein, Social and Economic Guarantees, supra note 4, at 6.
42 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CoNSTruTIONS Do 223 (2001);
Sunstein, Social and Economic Guarantees, supra note 4, at 7 ("[AIll constitutional rights cost
money. If the government plans to protect private property, it will have to expend resources to
ensure against both private and public intrusions." (footnote omitted)).
43 Sunstein, Social and Economic Guarantees, supra note 4, at 10.
4 See id. at 10-11.
45 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 40, at 2311-12 ("The argument from the text of the
Constitution suffers from similar disabilities. The text of the Constitution does not support the
idea that, as a whole, it was meant to be solely a charter of negative rights. Although many of
[Vol. 60:41006
THE FULL REALIZATION OF OUR RIGHTS
Constitution guarantees only negative rights. He has pointed out that
while the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal
prosecutions "looks like just another right to be left alone: the
government may not prevent a criminal defendant from having a
lawyer. ... [The Supreme] Court has long held that it imposes an
affirmative duty on the government to provide legal assistance if
the defendant cannot afford it."4 Similarly, Professor Currie has
noted that in protecting the right to contract, the Supreme Court
has "unequivocally interpreted a provision forbidding government
intrusion to require the government to protect the citizen against a
third party" and that "at least as early as Hobbes it had been
recognized that a contractual right was worthless without state
coercion."A7
Nonetheless, despite strong academic arguments to the contrary,
the U.S Constitution continues to be interpreted as a guarantor
of negative rights only.4 8 Typically, that understanding ends the
conversation on negative versus positive rights in the United States.
Conspicuously absent from that discussion, however, has been the
recognition that not only do many state constitutions separately
guarantee individual rights and liberties in the United States, a
significant number contain clear positive and affirmative guarantees
of social and economic individual rights.49 While enforcement of
those rights raises the traditional questions of judicial competency and
separation of powers, the existence of this separate and potentially
powerful source of socio-economic rights cannot be ignored. Faced
with these existing guarantees of important rights, the next step
should be to determine how best to vindicate them in the courts and
the rights it provides are phrased negatively, many are also phrased affirmatively. Even as to the
rights which are phrased negatively, their enforcement may require the imposition of affirmative
obligations on government. The conventional wisdom treats the affirmative rights as exceptions
to the general rule, but there is nothing inexorable about this conclusion." (footnote omitted));
Christiansen, supra note 36, at 346 ("A typical negative right ... is equally imprecise and gives
rise to a comparable need for interpretation ... as much as a typical positive right..
6 Currie, supra note 40, at 873.
41 Id. at 875; see also id. at 886 ("I think, however, that this survey has shown Judge
Posner's proposition [that the Constitution is a charter of negative rights only] must be applied
with caution. From the beginning there have been cases in which the Supreme Court, sometimes
very persuasively, has found in negatively phrased provisions constitutional duties that can in
some sense be described as positive.").
48 See Rao, supra note 39, at 245 n.235 ("As Judge Posner has explained, 'The men who
wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that Government might do too little for the people
but that it might do too much to them."' (citation omitted) (quoting Jackson v. City of Joliet,
715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983))). In its more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has
continued to uphold this interpretation. Id. (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)).
4 See infra Part u.C.I.a.
2010] 1007
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
legislatures around the United States. Because of the lack of federal
experience enforcing socio-economic rights provisions, state jurists
and advocates seeking to enforce these state constitutional rights must
look elsewhere for guidance.
C. Criticisms of Socio-Economic Rights
Even where socio-economic rights have been granted or
recognized, efforts to enforce those rights have faced significant
barriers, both practical and theoretical. Most of the critiques of
socio-economic rights derive from concerns about their positive
enforcement. The basic argument is that judicial recognition of an
obligation to fulfill socio-economic rights will inevitably require
courts to make policy decisions. Because courts lack both the
legitimacy and the competency to develop detailed policy and allocate
resources, opponents of socio-economic rights argue that such
decisions should be left to the political branches.
The legitimacy argument contends that policy decisions involving
allocation of finite resources are inherently political. Decisions that
require a selection between potentially conflicting priorities should
be made by the legislative or executive branches of government, both
of which are politically accountable to the people for their choices.o
This critique is often linked to arguments about the separation of
powers. The problem with this argument is that it proves too
much. Courts by their very nature are anti-democratic institutions.
Whenever a court recognizes a right, be it socio-economic or civil and
political, it restricts the will of the majority as expressed, though
imperfectly, through the legislative and executive branches and
checks the majority's ability to infringe upon the right. Further,
judicial protection of rights always imposes institutional costs. Even
enforcement of traditional civil and political rights, including due
process or equal protection, frequently requires policy changes that
impose additional program costs.
A related criticism maintains that courts, as institutions, are not
built to develop policy.51 The argument contends that negative rights
claims, which typically involve individual rights violations, are easier
for courts to manage because they "involve discrete cases, they
examine precise rights, and their remedies implicate only a cessation
5 See Langford, supra note 2, at 31; Christiansen, supra note 36, at 347-48 (arguing that
allowing courts to interpret social values impermissibly intrudes upon the duties of the
legislative branch).
51 See Langford, supra note 2, at 35.
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of action by government." 52 In contrast, socio-economic rights cases
are deemed ill-suited for a judicial forum because their resolution
requires government action to address complex issues that may
involve multiple stakeholders who often are not before the court,
significant expenditure of funds, and choices between competing
priorities.53
Although courts may not have a staff of experts on particular
policy issues, they do have various mechanisms to bring relevant and
necessary information before them, including special masters,
referees, amicus briefs, and experts who can be called as witnesses.
Further, as Professor Helen Hershkoff has noted, institutional
competence is "a comparative question," and "legislatures in many
states suffer from numerous institutional deficits that affect their
ability to focus on complex issues in a sustained and informed
manner." 54 For instance, many state legislatures are composed of
part-time legislators who meet for short sessions and have
small legislative staffs. 5 Moreover, state courts may have more
experience deciding cases that have a policy impact than federal
courts with their limited jurisdiction.56 Unlike the federal courts,
many state constitutions grant state courts expansive jurisdiction,
reaching so far as to allow them to grant advisory opinions or hear
"taxpayer standing" cases, in which any state taxpayer may challenge
a particular law on constitutional grounds.
Related to arguments about legitimacy and competency are claims
that socio-economic rights represent political aims, rather than
concrete rights and are too vague for courts to enforce.s In response
to this critique, Professor Hershkoff has argued that if an issue is
properly before a court, that court has a duty to "rise to the challenge"
of developing a manageable standard, rather than abdicate its
constitutional duty. 59 She has pointed out that courts regularly enforce
"substantive norms, almost all of which are without a determinative
52 Christiansen, supra note 36, at 345.
5 See id. at 348-50; Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial
Review, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1895, 1896-97 (2004).
5 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1131, 1176 (1999) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Positive
Rights].
5 Id. at 1176-77.
s6 Id. at 1181.
s7 See Joy Chia & Sarah A. Seo, Battle of the Branches: The Separation of Powers
Doctrine in State Education Funding Suits, 41 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 125, 127-31 (2007).
5 See ESCR-Net, Section 8: Challenging Misconceptions Around the
OP-ICESCR, http://www.escr-net.org/resources-more/resources more_show.htm?docid=429
173 (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
5 Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 54, at 1182.
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edge and require value selection." 60 In this respect, socio-economic
rights issues are no different than cutting edge issues in other areas,
and courts need only engage in the same process of looking to
evolved standards and customs and to the opinions of experts in the
field. Again, differences between state and federal courts may make
this task less daunting. As "common law generalists, state courts have
broad experience articulating normative frameworks for complex
social and economic issues."61
Further, both the legitimacy and competency arguments overstate
the role that judges play in enforcing economic and social rights. In
the socio-economic context, just like in the civil and political context,
"courts are not being asked to make law or policy but review it against
a set of criteria."62 The issue for enforcement of socio-economic
rights is how to develop the appropriate judicial standards for review.
When courts are asked to adjudicate violations of the government's
negative obligation to refrain from interfering with socio-economic
rights, judicial review would be similar to review of traditional
civil and political rights claims. In sketching out what judicial
review of state obligations to fulfill socio-economic rights should
look like, Professor Hershkoff has proposed a "jurisprudence of
consequences."63 Unlike the federal rational basis standard, which
starts with a presumption of constitutionality, a jurisprudence of
consequences would impose "a duty on the state to justify its
legislative choices as a well-grounded means of moving toward
a prescribed constitutional goal."6 While this approach would
necessarily engage the court in considering whether policy furthers a
constitutional right, Hershkoff has recognized that there is often "no
single 'right' answer to complex social problems."6 5 Rather than
determining what the right policy should be, judicial review would
focus on whether the laws are "likely to effectuate the constitutional
goal." 66
D. The Obligation to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill
Another way to step outside of the negative/positive rights
dichotomy is to use the human rights framework, which recognizes
that all rights encompass different types of government obligations.
60 Id. at 1180.
61 Id. at 1181.
62 Langford, supra note 2, at 34.
63 See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 54, at 1183-86.
6 Id. at 1184.
65 Id. at 1185.
6 Id. at 1184.
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Rather than categorizing rights as positive or negative, human rights
law recognizes that all rights entail three types of obligations: (1) the
obligation to respect, (2) the obligation to protect, and (3) the
obligation to fulfill.67 These three aspects of rights are also reflected
in the South African Constitution, which provides that the state "must
respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights."68
The obligation to respect captures the government's duty to abstain
from violating or interfering with rights, and correlates with negative
rights concepts that we are most familiar with in the United States
under our federal Constitution. However, governments can also
violate the obligation to respect socio-economic rights by improperly
interfering with individuals' ability to enjoy and access these
rights. For instance, Professor Langford has discussed developing
international jurisprudence finding that forced evictions can violate
the government's obligation to respect the right to housing. 69
The obligation to protect requires government action to protect
individuals from rights violations committed by non-governmental
actors. 70 Although U.S. law generally does not require government to
protect against such violations, as a normative and political matter,
we take for granted that the government should adopt legislation to
protect and punish rights violations by private actors. For instance,
government actions to protect against rights violations include the
adoption of laws prohibiting assault and murder and the more
recent adoption of domestic violence laws (violations of the rights
to life and personal security). They also include laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race and sex in the work place,7 1
and more recent laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation 7 2  (violations of the right to equality and
non-discrimination). Internationally, human rights bodies have found
governments in violation of their human rights obligations where their
efforts to prevent or punish rights violations lack due diligence.73
67 Cleveland, supra note 20.
6s S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 7(2).
6 See Langford, supra note 2, at 14-15.
70 The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defines the obligation to
protect as "measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive
individuals of their access [to the relevant right]." U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food
(Art. 11), 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
71 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 2000e (2006).
72 According to the Human Rights Campaign twenty-one states prohibit employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Employment
Laws and Policies, http://www.hrc.org/documents/EmploymentLaws andPolicies.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2010).
7 See generally Lee Hasselbacher, Note, State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence:
The European Court of Human Rights, Due Diligence, and International Legal Minimums of
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The obligation to fulfill is perhaps the most controversial of the
three obligations. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has identified two components of the obligation to fulfill. First,
governments have an obligation to take adequate steps within their
available resources toward progressive realization of the right.7 4
This obligation explicitly acknowledges that full realization of the
positive aspects of socio-economic rights cannot be accomplished
immediately and is subject to resource limitations. Second, the
Committee has suggested that governments have an obligation to
make sure that socio-economic rights are met at a minimum level.75
This obligation, defined as the "minimum core," is immediately
76
enforceable and not subject to progressive realization.
II. SOUTH AFRICAN CASES ON Socio-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Part II of this Article analyzes the South African Constitutional
Court's major socio-economic rights cases and endeavors to
understand the Court's theory of socio-economic rights, including the
nature of the government's obligation and the court's role in
enforcement.
A. Background and Summary of Cases
The Constitutional Court's socio-economic rights jurisprudence is
embodied in four recent cases: Soobramoney v. Minister of Health
(1997),77 Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2000),8 Minister of
Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (2002),79 and Khosa v.
Minister of Social Development (2004).8o Before discussing the
Court's decisions, a brief description of the relevant constitutional
provisions and a summary of the cases are in order.
Protection, 8 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 190 (2010) (discussing the development of the "due
diligence" standard).
74 See ICESCR, supra note 24, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 (providing that a State Party
undertake to "take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures").
7 See Langford, supra note 2, at 22.
76 The CESCR Committee discusses minimum core as "minimum essential levels of each
of the rights." ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The
Nature of States Parties Obligations, 110, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.6, at 14 (May 12, 2003)
[hereinafter General Comment 3].
77 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (S. Mr.).
7 2000 (l1) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.).
7 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Mr.).
- 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Mr.).
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The principal provisions protecting socio-economic rights in the
South African Constitution are Section 26 concerning housing and
Section 27 concerning social security, food, water, and health care.
In addition, Section 28 sets forth the rights of the child, which include
economic and social rights provisions. Sections 26 and 27 are
structured in a parallel fashion. Subsections 26(1) and 27(1) set out
general rights to have access to adequate housing and to health care
services, sufficient food and water and social security, respectively.83
Subsections 26(2) and 27(2) both provide that the "state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation" of the respective
rights."84 Subsections 26(3) and 27(3) then specifically enumerate
prohibited actions that violate the substantive rights in Subsections
26(1) and 27(1).15 Thus, Subsection 27(3) provides that "[n]o one
may be refused emergency medical treatment" 86 and Subsection 26(3)
prohibits evictions or home demolitions without a court order
"considering all the relevant circumstances" and prohibits legislation
permitting arbitrary evictions.
The Court's first socio-economic rights case was a difficult one. In
1997, Thiagraj Soobramoney, a forty-one-year-old man in the final
stages of chronic kidney failure, sought a court order directing the
provincial hospital to provide him ongoing dialysis treatment.88 Mr.
Soobramoney was not a candidate for a kidney transplant and
would require regular dialysis for the rest of his life.89 Without the
dialysis, he could not survive. The Constitutional Court rejected
Mr. Soobramoney's claim that he was entitled to ongoing dialysis
treatment under Subsection 27(3)'s emergency medical treatment
provision. 90 Instead, it considered his case under the state's obligation
to take reasonable measures to provide access to health care under
Subsections 27(1) and 27(2).91 The Court held that Mr. Soobramoney
si See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§ 26-27
82 See id. § 28(l).
83 See id. §§ 26(1), 27(1).
- Id. §§ 26(2), 27(2).
85 See id. §§ 26(3), 27(3).
86 Id. § 27(3).
87 Id. § 26(3).
88 Soobranoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at
1700 (S. Afr.).
89 See id. at 1698-99 (noting that appellant suffered from chronic renal failure and was
ineligible for transplant due to a heart condition).
9 Article 27(3) states that "[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment." S.
AFR. CONST. 1996, § 27(3). The Court held that emergency medical treatment did not include
"ongoing treatment of chronic illnesses for the purpose of prolonging life." Soobramoney, 1997
(12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at 1701.
91 See Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at 1704; see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996,
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was not entitled to ongoing dialysis because the hospital had a
reasonable plan to allocate scarce dialysis resources, which gave
priority to patients with treatable medical conditions, and that it had
applied the plan fairly and rationally.9 2 Underscoring the wrenching
nature of socio-economic cases, Mr. Soobramoney died of a stroke
within hours of hearing the court's decision, and the media criticized
the Court for "sentencing Soobramoney to death." 93
Three years later, the Court considered a case brought by Irene
Grootboom, as well as 390 other adults and 510 children94 who
were rendered homeless following eviction from informal settlements
on land earmarked for the construction of low-income housing.95
Although the Court rejected the respondents' request for an order
requiring the government to immediately provide them adequate basic
shelter or housing,96 it found that the government had violated its
obligations under Subsection 26(2) because its housing plan in the
Cape Metro area "failed to provide for any form of relief to those
[like the respondents] desperately in need of access to housing." 97 As
a remedy, the Court issued a declaration stating that the constitution
required that state to "devise and implement within its available
resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively
to realize the right of access to adequate housing," which had to
include reasonable measures to "provide relief for people who have
no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in
intolerable conditions or crisis situations."98
In the 2002 case, Minister of Health v. Treatment Action
Campaign,99 the Constitutional Court considered the government's
policy on the provision of nevirapine within the public health
sector.'" Nevirapine is an antiretroviral drug given to HIV-positive
pregnant women to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission. 0
The government argued that its policy of limiting the availability of
nevirapine to selected pilot sites in each province was reasonable
§ 27(l)-(2).
9 Soobramoney, 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at 1704-05.
9 Richard J. Goldstone, A South African Perspective on Social and Economic Rights,
HuM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2006, at 4, 5.
94 Gov't of the Republic of South Afica & Others v. Grootboom & Others 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1176 n.2 (S. Afr.).
9 Id. at 1176.
96 See id. at 1204-05, 1208.
9 Id. at 1208.
9 Id. at 1209.
9 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.).
10 See id. at 1035.
1o1 Id. at 1035 n.3.
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because it did not want to provide the drug without a "full package"
of other interventions.102 In particular, the government expressed
concern that the efficacy of a dose of nevirapine at birth would
be counteracted by the transmission of HIV from mother to infant
through breastfeeding. 03 The Court, however, found that the
government's policy violated Section 27(2)'s mandate to undertake
reasonable measures to ensure the access to health care provided
for in Section 27(1)(a).'4 The Court held that the policy was not
reasonable because it failed to address the needs of poor mothers
and their children who did not have access to the pilot sites.105
The 2003 case, Khosa v. Minister of Social Development,106
challenged the statutory exclusion of lawful permanent residents
from social service grants for older South Africans, arguing that
government policy violated the right to social security under Section
27(1)(c) and (2).107 The Court found that the government's exclusion
of lawful permanent residents constituted unfair discrimination
and declared that although the government was not obligated to
immediately realize social security for all, adopting discriminatory
criteria was not reasonable. os
B. The Nature of Socio-Economic Rights
1. Negative Component of Socio-Economic Rights
When the Constitutional Court certified the South African
Constitution in 1996, it was asked to consider whether the
constitution's socio-economic rights provisions were justiciable. The
Court rejected arguments that the costs of enforcing socio-economic
rights made them unenforceable, noting that many civil and political
rights "will give rise to similar budgetary implications without
1o2Id. at 1051.
10 Id. at 1050. In order to counteract transmission through breastfeeding, the government
argued that it would need to provide breast milk substitutes, including vitamins and antibiotics
and that counseling services would need to be provided to ensure that they would be properly
used. Id.
104Id. at 1057 (finding the government's policy "inflexible" for withholding a "potentially
lifesaving drug ... without any known harm to mother or child").
105 Id.
16 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Mr.).
10 Id. at 569. The case also challenged the exclusion of lawful permanent residents from
child support grants and child dependency grants, but the government decided not to support
these provisions. Id. at 569, 574.
1osId. at 596-98 (noting that "citizenship is typically not within the control of the
individual and is ... a characteristic of personhood not alterable by conscious action," making it
analogous to expressly unlawful bases for differentiation).
2010] 1015
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
compromising their justiciability."'t10 But the Court stopped short
of expressing unqualified support for the affirmative enforcement
of socio-economic rights, explaining that "[a]t the very minimum,
socio-economic rights can be negatively protected from improper
invasion.""o In its later cases, discussed below, the Court articulated
a commitment and methodology for affirmative government
obligations, but its recognition of a negative aspect of socio-economic
rights is also significant.
In discussing the negative and positive components of the right to
housing in Grootboom, the Constitutional Court suggested that the
government's negative obligations-to not interfere with or impair
access to housing-are immediately enforceable, but that the
government's affirmative obligations may be more circumscribed.
The Court read the first section of Article 26 to "confer[] a general
right of access to adequate housing."' This general right places "at
the very least, a negative obligation . . . upon the State and all other
entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of
access to adequate housing."ll 2
The negative obligation recognized by the Court correlates to the
"obligation to respect" and to some degree the "obligation to
protect" recognized under international human rights law.1 3 Although
most scholarship to date has focused on government's affirmative
socio-economic rights obligations, internationally, there are a growing
number of cases regarding the government's duty to abstain from
interfering with human rights."14  Interestingly, the Court in
Grootboom wrote that "other entities and persons," in addition to the
state, have negative obligations not to prevent or impair housing
access rights."' This is consistent with developing international
jurisprudence concerning both the state "obligation to protect" by
taking measures to ensure that private actors do not deprive
'In re Certification of the South African Constitution 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) [ 78 (S.
Afr.); see also Goldstone, supra note 93, at 4 (noting that the "dichotomy between positive and
negative rights breaks down at a fundamental level because many judicial decisions involve
some determination of the allocation of public funds").
0 ln re Certification, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 60-61.
11 Gov't of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1184 (S. Afr.).
"2Id. at 1188.
3 The South African Constitution recognizes and incorporates these obligations. Section
7(2) obligates the government to "respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of
Rights." S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 7(2).
"
4 See Langford, supra note 2, at 14. Malcolm Langford writes that violations of the
obligation to respect "are frequently the subject of reports by non-governmental organisations
and some predict that they will [form] the majority of cases under the proposed complaints
procedure for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." Id.
"
5Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at I188.
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individuals of their rights and the "horizontal application of
fundamental rights" to impose human rights obligations on private
actors. 116
Similarly, in Treatment Action Campaign, the Court recognized
that the right to access health care includes a negative obligation. The
government's nevirapine policy essentially prevented doctors from
providing the drug to public health patients who did not have access
to the pilot sites, violating the government's negative obligation by
undermining the women's right to decide their course of treatment
and their ability to access medically appropriate services."
The Constitutional Court has also issued a number of decisions
interpreting the government's negative obligations in housing rights
cases involving forced evictions.118 In addition to the negative
obligations created by Subsection 26(1), these cases rely on the
specific prohibition of arbitrary evictions in Subsection 26(3) and its
implementing legislation.119 These cases are interesting because they
recognize that, although the government does not have an affirmative
obligation to make housing immediately available, it cannot act
(through an eviction proceeding) to deprive people of existing
housing without taking into account the impact of the eviction on the
right to housing and considering alternative ways to resolve the
situation.120 The cases also suggest that the court must balance the
property rights of those seeking to evict with the housing rights of
those they seek to evict. The "critical point" made by Justice Sachs
in Port Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers,'2 1 is that "in the
clash between property rights and 'the genuine despair of people in
dire need of accommodation,' the court should not automatically
116 An in-depth discussion of "horizontal application" of fundamental rights is beyond the
scope of this Article. See Langford, supra note 2, at 20-21. The South African Constitution
explicitly provides for horizontal application of the bill of rights. Section 8(2) states that a
provision of the bill of rights "binds a natural [and] juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the
right." S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 8(2). Courts "must apply, or if necessary develop, the common
law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right" Id. § 8(3)(a).
"1 Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10) BCLR
1033 (CC) at 1049 (S. Afr.). (citing Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1188). The
respondents argued that there was "no rational or lawful basis for allowing doctors in the
private sector to exercise their professional judgment in deciding when to prescribe Nevirapine,
but effectively prohibiting doctors in the public sector from doing so." Id. at 1041 (quoting
Resp't Aff. 122.11 (prepared by Siphokazi Mthathi, Deputy-Chairperson for Treatment Action
Campaign)).
118For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa:
Adjudicating Rights Under a Transformative Constitution, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 2, at 75, 91-95.
"
9 Id. at 92.
120 Id. at 92-95.
1212004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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privilege property rights. Their role instead is to find a just and
equitable solution in the context of the specific factors relevant in
each particular case."1 22
2. Positive Obligation: Progressive Realization Versus
Minimum Core
Although the Constitutional Court continues to recognize that
socio-economic rights have both negative and positive components,
its major socio-economic rights cases focus on the enforceability of
the state's affirmative obligations. 123 These cases recognize a positive
obligation to progressively realize socio-economic rights, but decline
to recognize them either as individual rights or as an immediately
enforceable obligation to provide some minimum level of the right-
an obligation also known as a the "minimum core." 24 Instead,
the South African Constitutional Court enforces the government's
affirmative economic and social rights obligations by forcing the
government to adopt and implement a reasonable policy to address
societal needs.125 The Court's decisions regarding the government's
affirmative obligation have made a considerable contribution
to developing human rights jurisprudence concerning judicial
enforcement of the "obligation to fulfill" socio-economic rights.
However, it has also been criticized for rejecting the minimum core
approach that has been championed by the CESCR Committee.126
a. Rejection of Individual Rights
The Court has consistently refused to hold that the state's
affirmative obligations give individuals rights that can be
immediately enforced.127 Instead, it has found that the state's positive
122Liebenberg, supra note 118, at 92 (quoting Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various
Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) at 1280) (footnote omitted).
123 See Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10)
BCLR 1033 (CC) at 1042-43 (S. Afr.); Gov't of the Republic of South Africa & Others v
Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1183 (S. Afr.).
124 General Comment 3, supra note 76, 110.
'Cass Sunstein has described the court's jurisprudence as "steering a middle course
between two straightforward positions: (a) the socio-economic rights are nonjusticiable and (b)
the socio-economic rights create an absolute duty, on government's part, to ensure protection for
everyone who needs them." Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South
Africa 12 (U. Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 124 (2d Series) &
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 12, 2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com
/paper.taf~abstract id=269657 [hereinafter Sunstein, Lessons from South Africa].
12 6 See Liebenberg, supra note 118, at 90.
2 The Court's approach is somewhat at odds with courts in the United States, which have
emphasized that judicial remedies should be limited to the plaintiffs before the court and that
courts should not engage in broader systemic relief. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc.
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obligations require the development and implementation of policies to
realize socio-economic rights for the society as whole.12 8 Thus, in
Grootboom, the Court reversed the order of the court below requiring
that shelter be provided to the applicants before the court.12 9 Although
the plaintiffs were living in "intolerable" conditions, it was "a painful
reality that their circumstances were no worse than those of thousands
of other people."o30 Under such circumstances, the Constitutional
Court held that making housing available only to the plaintiffs before
the court would give them an unfair preference. 13 1 Similarly, in
Soobramoney, the Court rejected Mr. Soobramoney's individual
claim for dialysis.132 In considering the reasonableness of his claim, it
looked at the cost and impact of providing dialysis to all similarly
situated individuals, not just the cost in his individual case.133 The
Court discussed the "danger of making any order that the resources be
used for a particular patient" without a broader sense of whether
resources might "more advantageously be devoted" to others.134
The Court's unwillingness to create individual, immediately
enforceable rights is further illustrated by its refusal to recognize an
immediate right to shelter for children in Grootboom even though the
constitution's children's rights provision'3 5 could have been read to
support the obligation. Instead, the Court held that the state does not
have an immediate obligation to provide shelter for children who are
in their parents' care.136 It wrote that the obligation to provide shelter
"is imposed primarily on the parents or family." 3 7 The state only
v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 347 (N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the trial court's provision that its equal
education remedy be statewide). Public interest litigation in the United States typically
addresses this problem by bringing individual cases to hold that government policies of broad
application are illegal or unconstitutional and by bringing class action lawsuits.
'
28 See Sunstein, Lessons from South Africa, supra note 125, at 13.
'
29 Gov't of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (ll)
BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1208 (S. Afr.).
130id. at 1205.
13 1 Id.
132 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at
1701 (S. Afr.). Mr. Soobramoney also argued that he had a right to dialysis under Article 27(3),
which provides that "[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment." Id. at 1700
(quoting S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 27(3)). The Court held that the emergency medical treatment
only applied to sudden catastrophes and not to ongoing treatment of chronic illness. See id. at
1703-04.
133 See id. at 1705.
3 Id. at 1706.
'" The South African Constitution provides that "[elvery child has the right ... to family
care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family
environment ... [and] to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services."
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 28(l)(b)-(c).
16Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1204.
37 Id.
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becomes responsible for shelter when a child is removed from his or
her family.138 The Court's analysis reflects its continuing concern that
creating a "direct and enforceable right" for some individuals would
undermine the "carefully constructed constitutional scheme for
progressive realisation of socio-economic rights."l39
b. Rejection of Minimum Core
Beyond rejecting the individual claims at issue in the cases, the
Court has also refrained from adopting the minimum core concept
developed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court explicitly declined
to recognize that everyone has an immediate right to a minimum
core.'" While the Court's holding relied on a textual reading of the
health care provision,141 it discussed its practical concerns with the
minimum core concept:
It is impossible to give everyone access even to a 'core'
service immediately. All that is possible, and all that can be
expected of the State, is that it act reasonably to provide
access to the socio-economic rights identified in [the health
care and housing provisions] on a progressive basis.14 2
In addition to resource concerns, the Court questioned judicial
competence to make the factual determinations necessary to engage
in a minimum core analysis or to decide what constitutes the
minimum core.14 3 It also expressed concerns about making decisions
that would "have multiple social and economic consequences for the
community"14 or that would require "deciding how public revenues
should most effectively be spent."l 4 5 Thus, the Court appears more
comfortable reviewing the reasonableness of the policies adopted by
138 Id.
19 1d. at 1202.
" See Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10)
BCLR 1033 (CC) at 1049 (S. Afr.) (deciding that "the socio-economic rights of the Constitution
should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core be provided to
them").
141 See id. at 1045.
142 1d. at 1046.
143 See id. at 1047 ("[C]ourts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging
factual and political enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum-core standards
called for by the first and second amici should be. . . ."); see also Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC) at 1188 ("The [CESCR] committee developed the concept of minimum core over
many years of examining reports by reporting states. This Court does not have comparable
information.").
4 Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at 1047.
145 Id.
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the government to meet its constitutional obligations than defining the
core of the right or stating what the policy should be.146
Despite its rejection of a minimum core right, the Court did not
completely abandon the cause of individuals facing severe denials
of socio-economic rights. In Grootboom, for example, the Court
explained that "[tihere may be cases where it may be possible and
appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum core
obligation to determine whether measures taken by the State are
reasonable."1 4 7 Although the Grootboom appellants were not entitled
to a court order requiring the government to provide them shelter, the
Court held that the government's failure to take their situation into
account rendered its housing policy unreasonable.14 8
C. Reasonableness Review
In addition to establishing that the constitution's socio-economic
rights provisions do not create an individual entitlement, the
Constitutional Court has made clear that the government's affirmative
obligation is subject to the limitations of reasonableness. Such
limitations allow the government to take into account its available
resources in formulating policy and to realize its obligations over
time. 149 These positive obligations are "establish[ed] and delimit[ed]"
by Subsection (2), which provides that the state must take "reasonable
legislative and other measures ... within its available resources . .. to
achieve the progressive realisation of this right."5 o
In Grootboom and the cases following it, the Constitutional Court
sought to provide guidance about what constitutes a reasonable
government policy to progressively realize socio-economic rights
within its available resources and the role that the court should play in
ensuring that the government fulfills its obligations. These cases
establish a careful balance between deference to the legislative branch
146 See id. ("The Constitution contemplates ... a restrained and focused role for the courts,
namely, to require the State to take on measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to
subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.").
147 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). Similarly, in Treatment Action Campaign, the
Court stated that although evidence in certain cases "may show that there is a minimum core of
a particular service that should be taken into account in determining whether measures adopted
by the State are reasonable, the socio-economic rights of the Constitution should not be
construed as entitling everyone to demand that the minimum core be provided to them."
Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at 1046 (footnote omitted).
148 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1208.
14 9 Khosa v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) at 589 (S. Afr.).
The Court stated that "the ambit of the section 27(1) right can ... not be determined without
reference to the reasonableness of the measures adopted to fulfil the obligation towards those
entitled to the right in section 27(1)." Id.
50 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1184.
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and its institutional competency to establish policy in the first
instance and the recognition that the Court has an important role to
play in ensuring that the government is fulfilling its constitutional
obligations. Although the Court's reasonableness analysis must be
done on a case-by-case basis, its jurisprudence to date makes clear
that the government's policy must take into account the needs of
those facing the most dire deprivation of rights, must not violate other
constitutional rights, and must be adopted and implemented in good
faith.
1. Judicial Deference to Reasonable Policies
From the outset, the Constitutional Court has been careful to
establish the need for deference to reasonable government policies.
The Court's deference appears rooted in the recognition of two
important considerations in enforcing affirmative government
obligations. First, there are often multiple ways for the government to
fulfill its affirmative obligations.' 5 Mindful of concerns about
judicial competency and separation of powers, the Constitutional
Court has repeatedly stated that its job is not to opine whether
''more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted,
or whether public money could have been better spent."l5 2 Thus,
"[c]ourt orders concerning policy choices made by the executive
should ... not be formulated in ways that preclude the executive from
making .. . legitimate choices."' 5 3 Second, the Court has stressed the
need to allow flexibility in policies. Circumstances may change,
budgets may shrink, or better policy options can emerge. The
government should remain free to change its policies as long as it
continues to meet its constitutional obligations.15 4 Thus, in Treatment
Action Campaign, although the Court ordered the government to
make nevirapine available at all public health facilities,'55 it made
clear that its order did not preclude the government from adapting its
151 Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at 1047 (finding that "[i]t is
necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the State to
meet its obligations" (quoting Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1191) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
1
52 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1191; see also Khosa, 2004 (6) BCLR 569
(CC) at 590-91.
153 Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at 1066.
15 See id. ("A factor that needs to be kept in mind is that policy is and should be flexible.
It may be changed at any time and the executive is always free to change policies where it
considers it appropriate to do so. The only constraint is that policies must be consistent with the
Constitution and the law.").
'55 See id. at 1072.
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policy "in a manner consistent with the Constitution if equally
appropriate or better methods become available." 56
Although the Court gives deference to the government, its review
is not perfunctory. The Court has emphasized that it is obliged to
"consider whether in formulating and implementing .. . policy the
State has given effect to its constitutional obligations."l57 Programs
adopted by the government must be "capable of facilitating the
realisation of the right," and they must be reasonable. 158 The
government action must also be "taken in good faith," 59 and "the
[s]tate must take steps to achieve [its] goal,"160 moving as
"expeditiously and effectively as possible."'61 In addition, the Court
will look beyond the government's legislative scheme and consider
how the legislation and policy are actually being implemented. Such
review ensures that the executive adopts "well-directed policies and
programmes" that are "reasonable both in their conception and their
implementation., 6 2
2. What's Reasonable?
a. Reasonable Programs Cannot Neglect Those Most in Need
Although the Court rejected an approach that would require the
immediate realization of a minimum core of socio-economic needs,
its reasonableness review requires policy-makers to take into account
the needs of those who lack basic necessities.
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the
degree and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to
realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose
ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not
be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of
the right . . . . If the measures, though statistically successful,
fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may
not pass the test.16 3
156 Id.
1s1 Id. at 1062.
158 Gov't of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1190-91 (S. Afr.).
I5 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at
1706 (S. Afr.).
'60 Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1192.
161 Id. (quoting General Comment 3, supra note 76, 19).
162 1d. at 1191.
163 Id.
2010] 1023
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
In Grootboom, the Court found that the government's national
housing program constituted "a major achievement," aimed at
"achieving the progressive realisation of the right of access to
adequate housing."'1" The program, however, did not include a
component to deal with those in desperate need.'65 Thus, the Court
found that the housing program fell short of obligations imposed on
the government because it "fail[ed] to recognise that the State must
provide for relief for those in desperate need." The Court emphasized
that the acute and immediate needs of the homeless cannot be ignored
by a housing program that focuses instead on medium and long-term
objectives.166
The recognition that reasonable policies must take into account
those most in need was echoed in Treatment Action Campaign. There,
the Court noted that the program adopted by the government failed to
address the needs of women who relied on public health services and
did not have access to pilot sites.167 Although the government limited
the availability of nevirapine in public hospitals, doctors in the private
sector were able to prescribe the drug.16 8 The Court expressed concern
that the impact of the government's limitation of the drug to its
research sites would be borne by poor women unable to access private
health services.169
b. Fundamental Rights: Non-Discrimination
In Treatment Action Campaign and Grootboom, the Court found
the government's policies unreasonable because the needs of the
homeless and women who relied on government health care were not
being taken into account. In both cases, the Court was troubled that
the government policies failed to address the needs of disadvantaged
segments of society. It instructed that "[a] programme that excludes a
significant segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable."170
In Khosa, the Court articulated another factor that must be taken
into account in determining whether a government program to realize
6Id. at 1198.
165 See id. at 1200. The court found that the program failed the reasonableness analysis
because there was "no express provision to facilitate access to temporary relief for people who
have no access to land, no roof over their heads, for people who are living in intolerable
conditions and for people who are in crisis because of natural disasters such as floods or fires, or
because their homes are under threat of demolition." Id. at 1198.
16Id. at 1201.
67 Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10) BCLR
1033 (CC) at 1054 (S. Afr.).
16 8 See id. at 1040-41, 1053, 1055.
'
69 See id. at 1055.
70ld. at 1054 (quoting Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1191).
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socio-economic rights satisfies the reasonableness review-whether
the program infringes on other fundamental rights. Specifically, the
Court held that a government benefits program was not a reasonable
means to achieve the right to social security because it explicitly
excluded lawful permanent residents. 7 ' In doing so, the Court
suggested that, in addition to considering whether a program is
reasonably designed to progressively realize the right, it will also
consider whether the program infringes on other fundamental rights,
such as equality: "When the rights to life, dignity and equality are
implicated in cases dealing with socio-economic rights, they have to
be taken into account along with the availability of human and
financial resources in determining whether the State has complied
with the constitutional standard of reasonableness."1 72 In judging the
reasonableness of the methods by which the legislature chooses to
give effect to the state's positive obligations, the Court must take
into account whether the program "unreasonably limits other
constitutional rights."l 7 3
Interestingly, the Court suggested that the state could justify not
paying benefits to all for financial reasons, but required that the
criteria it uses to limit payments must be consistent with the South
African bill of rights. 174 Had the government maintained that the
exclusion of permanent residents was temporary or that it was "an
incident of attempts by it progressively to realize everyone's right of
access to social security," the Court may have reached a different
decision.'75 Instead, the government contended that "non-citizens
have no legitimate claim of access to social security."' 76 Because the
state had no plan or intention to progressively realize permanent
residents' right to social security, the Court focused its review on the
reasonableness of the exclusion rather than the reasonableness of the
social service program as a whole.17 7
17 Khosa v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Aft.).
172 Id. at 589.
173 Id. In Soobramoney, the Court suggested that if health care decisions were made in an
unconstitutionally discriminatory manner, it would have been grounds to interfere with the
government's program. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12)
BCLR 1696 (CC) at 1707 (S. Afr.); see also Goldstone, supra note 93, at 5.
174 See Khosa, 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) at 589.
75 Id. at 591.76 Id.
77 See id. at 589 ("What makes this case different to other cases that have previously been
considered by this Court is that, in addition to the rights of life and dignity, the social-security
scheme put in place by the State to meet its obligations under section 27 of the Constitution
raises the question of the prohibition of unfair discrimination."); see also id. at 600 ("The only
challenge to the scheme is that it denies access to non-citizens. There is no suggestion that the
scheme is otherwise inappropriate or inconsistent with the Constitution.").
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The government argued that the expense, its immigration policy,
and the need to encourage immigrant self-sufficiency justified the
exclusion of lawful permanent residents.'7 8  Although the Court
conceded that the exclusion might be rational, it held that its
reasonableness standard required more than rationality and that
a rational differentiation might still be discriminatory. 179 Although
citizenship was not listed explicitly in the constitution's
non-discrimination provision, the Court found that it was analogous
to the grounds that were listed.180  In determining whether the
discrimination was unfair, the Court considered the position of
permanent residents in society, noting that they have "little political
muscle" and that citizenship is an attribute that is difficult to
change.18' It concluded that the exclusion constituted intentionally
unequal statutory treatment that carried with it a strongly stigmatizing
effect.18 2 The Court also found that the exclusion adversely affected
permanent residents by undermining their dignity and forcing them
into relationships of dependency on their families and communities.18 3
The Court's decision was driven by "the importance of providing
access to social assistance to all who live permanently in South
Africa." 84 It rejected the government's justifications for its policy
because "the impact upon life and dignity that a denial of such access
has[] far outweighs the financial and immigration considerations on
which the state relies." 8 5 It concluded that "the denial of access to
social grants to permanent residents who, but for their citizenship,
would qualify for such assistance does not constitute a reasonable
178 The Court suggested that limiting the cost of social welfare is a legitimate concern, and
that it would be permissible to control permanent resident applications to exclude those who
may become burdens to the state. See id. at 595. The Court also determined, however, that after
the state chooses to admit permanent residents and allows them to make their homes in South
Africa, it cannot later abandon them. In such instances, the social welfare expense "may be a
cost we have to pay for the constitutional commitment to developing a caring society." Id.
'
79 Id. at 596. The Court distinguished its test from U.S. federal courts' rational basis
standard, asserting that its test is higher than mere rationality. See id. The rational basis standard
led U.S. courts to uphold rational, yet discriminatory provisions affecting permanent residents.
In City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit applied a
rational basis standard of review to uphold a federal program that excluded permanent residents
from receiving benefits. See id. at 603-09. The court noted that heightened scrutiny was
improper for federal classifications based on alienage because of Congress's power to regulate
immigration. See id. at 604 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1976)).
1s0 See Khosa, 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) at 597 (S. Afr.) ("To be considered an analogous
ground of differentiation . . . the classification must . . . have an adverse effect on the dignity of
the individual, or some other comparable effect.").
8 1 Id.
182 Id. at 598.
183 See id. at 599 ("[T]he exclusion of permanent residents [from the scheme] ... is likely
to have a severe impact on the dignity of [the persons concerned].").
184 Id. at 601.
1ss Id.
1026 [Vol. 60:4
THE FULL REALIZATION OF OUR RIGHTS
legislative measure as contemplated by section 27(2) of the
Constitution."186
c. Good Faith
Another factor influencing the Court's reasonableness analysis is
the government's good faith in creating and implementing its policy
initiatives. In Soobramoney, for example, the Court appeared
convinced that the department of health had done its best to develop a
fair system to allocate dialysis, a scarce commodity, and that the
program it developed was not discriminatory. Thus, it deferred to
the provincial administration, writing that the Court "will be slow
to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the
political organs and medical authorities."' 87 In later cases where the
Court was not convinced that the government policy reflected a
true commitment to achieving socio-economic rights, it was less
deferential to the government's decisions and judgment.
The Treatment Action Campaign case followed years of
government failure to make nevirapine available despite evidence of
its safety and efficacy and an offer by the drug manufacturer to make
it available for free.'88 In light of past history suggesting that the
government did not take its constitutional obligations seriously, the
Court declined to defer to the government's expertise in developing
health policy. Instead, it independently reviewed the evidence and
rejected several of the government's contentions. For instance, the
government submitted an affidavit contending that "[mother-to-child
transmission] of HIV-1 through breastmilk negates all the gains of the
use of Nevirapine in the mother during delivery and in the newborn
child within 72 hours after birth."'"9 The Court, however, found the
government's conclusion unsupported by the underlying data and
concluded instead that the "wealth of scientific material . . . makes
plain that sero-conversion of HIV takes place in some, but not
all, cases and that nevirapine thus remains to some extent efficacious
186 Id.
187 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at
1706 (S. Afr.).
188 See Goldstone, supra note 93, at 5 ("Some senior ministers, and even President Thabo
Mbeki . . . have denied that the virus HIV is the cause of AIDS. As such, only two testing
stations in two medical facilities were set up within the country, effectively denying Nevirapine
to 90 percent of South Africa's pregnant mothers."); see also Ray, supra note 9, at 162
(suggesting that the political background and "oblique references in the judgment ... suggest
that the Court was reacting to what it perceived as a refusal by the government to take seriously
its constitutional obligations under Section 27 when developing the pilot program").
189Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10) BCLR
1033 (CC) at 1052 (S. Afr.).
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in combating mother-to-child transmission even if the mother
breastfeeds her baby." 90 The Court also discounted the government's
concern about development of nevirapine-resistant strains of HIV,
concluding that the danger of such mutation "is small in comparison
with the potential benefit of providing a single tablet of nevirapine to
the mother and a few drops to her baby at the time of birth."'91
Finally, the Court dismissed the government's safety concerns about
the drug, stating that those concerns presented "no more than a
hypothetical issue."1 9 2 According to the Court the only evidence of
potential harm involved administration of nevirapine on an ongoing
basis to HIV positive individuals. For prevention of mother-to-child
transmission, the WHO recommended a dose of nevirapine "without
qualification," an endorsement reflecting the medical consensus that
the single dose would cause harm to neither mother nor child.193
Moreover, the government's policy of making nevirapine available at
sites that catered to 10% of public sector births and to the private
sector undermined its claims of safety concerns.194
In Khosa, the Court disagreed with a basic premise of the
government's policy-its position that permanent residents did not
have a right to social security.'95 Given that the government's policy
was based on an erroneous assumption about the rights of permanent
residents, the Court was less willing to defer to its policy decisions.
As a result the Court independently scrutinized the evidence and
declined to defer to the government's judgment. The government
argued that the cost of providing benefits to permanent residents
made it reasonable to exclude them.196 Although the government
failed to provide definite evidence regarding the additional cost of the
grants,19 7 the Director of Social Services in the National Treasury
estimated that it could range between R243 million and R672
million.198 Using the higher estimate, the Court challenged the
government's judgment about the significance of the cost, stating that
the additional amount the government would have to pay "reflects an
increase of less than 2% on the present cost of social grants," which
19o Id.
'1' Id.
192 Id.
93 Id. at 1052-53.
'94Id. at 1053.
95 See Khosa v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) at 593 (S. Afr.).
196See id. The Court acknowledged that such financial concerns were legitimate and
reasonable, but did not justify a blanket exclusion of all non-citizens from social security. Id.
197 Id. at 594.
'98 Id.
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would be "only a small proportion of the total cost" of the program.199
In dissent, Justice Ngcobo argued that, given the paucity of
information about cost, the Court should defer to the political
branches because they have "the expertise necessary to present a
reasonable prediction about future social conditions." 200
3. The Court's Role
The cases discussed above establish the Court's framework for
finding violations of the economic and social rights provisions. But
the question remains whether judicial involvement in socio-economic
rights will lead to improved enforcement and implementation of
socio-economic rights consistent with the government's constitutional
obligations. To answer this question, this subsection looks at the
Court's judicial remedies and considers the potential advantages of a
dialogic process for implementation of socio-economic rights.
a. Appropriate Remedies
The Constitutional Court has been reticent to impose mandatory
orders or ongoing court supervision of compliance-actions Mark
Tushnet refers to as "strong" judicial remedies. 201 Rather than
reflecting the view that it is never appropriate for the court to issue
injunctive relief or retain supervisory jurisdiction, however, the cases
suggest a more contextual approach in which the Court determines
the appropriate relief after evaluating the specific circumstances of a
case.
The Court has made clear that it has the power to issue mandatory
orders and supervisory injunctions,202 but has acknowledged that such
orders may not be appropriate in every instance, stressing the need to
retain flexibility to tailor its remedy to the circumstances of the
case.2 03 Thus, despite its power to do so, the Court has consistently
declined to retain supervisory jurisdiction,20 seeking instead to give
19 Id.
20o ld. at 615.
201 Tushnet, supra note 53, at 1911 (noting that in the South African cases the courts have
favored weak remedies that do not spell out in detail what government officials are to do).202 In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court rejected the government's argument that its
power is limited to declaratory relief. Emphasizing its "duty to ensure that effective relief is
granted," the Court stressed that it has a wide range of powers to enforce the Constitution,
including mandamus and supervisory jurisdiction. Minister of Health & Others v Treatment
Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at 1064, 1066 (S. Afr.).
203 See id. at 1066.
204 See, e.g., Gov't of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1191 (S. Afr.) (granting supervisory jurisdiction to the South African
Human Rights Commission).
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the government the opportunity to develop the specifics of a policy
that meets constitutional muster. In Grootboom, for example, it issued
a declaration that the government's policy was unreasonable and left
it to the government to revise its approach.2 05
Kent Roach has suggested that declarations and recommendations
are appropriate remedies for socio-economic rights "at least to start
the process of compliance."206 Declarations take into account
concerns about the Court's institutional competency in crafting policy
and its ability to ensure compliance. Because its effectiveness
requires a dialogue between the court and the government, the
appropriateness of declaratory relief will depend on the good faith of
the government, the "moral suasion of the judicial body," and the
political pressure that can be exerted by civil society and other
relevant stakeholders.20 7
In Treatment Action Campaign and Khosa, the Court showed less
deference than in Grootboom, and the remedies it ordered were
further reaching. In Treatment Action Campaign, the Court ordered
the government to remove the restrictions on nevirapine at public
health facilities that were not pilot sites, to make the drug available
when medically indicated, and to make provisions for counseling and
testing to support the use of the drug.208 Similarly, in Khosa, the
Court rewrote the Social Assistance Act to include permanent
residents.20
The Court's willingness to order the government to take action in
Treatment Action Campaign reflects the fact that the case did not
stretch the Court's institutional competency. The lengthy record
before the Court, the drug manufacturer's offer to make nevirapine
available for free, and the relatively straightforward policy choice
made it easier for the Court to challenge government policy and order
specific policy changes. Moreover, in both Treatment Action
Campaign and Khosa, the Court was able to issue orders that were
limited in scope, requiring alterations to the government's existing
policies, rather than the development of entirely new policies from
scratch.2 10 Finally, in both instances, the government arguably had not
2 05 See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1191.
206 Kent Roach, The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic
Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 46, 52.207 Id.
208 Id. at 1071.
209See Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) at 602-03,
605-06 (S. Afr.).
210See Ray, supra note 9, at 178 (stating that in Treatment Action Campaign, "the Court
was able to take a direct role to fill the gap that the government's recalcitrance had created but
at the same time to still avoid the problems that were likely to arise by engaging in extensive
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acted in good faith, making it less appropriate for the Court to issue
declaratory relief and leave it to the government to devise and
implement a policy that complied with its order.
Although its decisions have stopped short of supervisory
jurisdiction, the Court indicated that such relief may be appropriate
when "necessary to secure compliance with a court order." 211 The
government's "failure to heed declaratory orders or other relief
granted by a court in a particular case," the Court explained, would be
212
one such case. Thus, Grootboom might be understood as reflecting
a preference for giving the government an opportunity to develop a
compliant housing policy in the first instance in a case where there is
no prior history of bad faith. If the government action at issue
establishes bad faith, however, the Court is more likely to issue a
mandatory order. If there is a history of failing to comply with court
orders, supervisory jurisdiction may be appropriate. In support of this
theory, Brian Ray pointed out that in more recent housing cases, the
Cape Town High Court proved willing to invoke the oversight powers
that the Constitutional Court declined to use because the City of Cape
Town failed to comply with the Grootboom decision.2 13
b. Dialogic Review and Acceptance and Implementation
In addition to looking at the remedies the Court chooses, it is
important to analyze how judicial review can increase acceptance of
socio-economic rights as a societal value, create processes for more
transparent and inclusive policy decision making, and amplify
political pressure for meaningful implementation.
Irrespective of whether courts issue strong or weak judicial
remedies in socio-economic rights cases, knowing that courts may
court directed policy making").
211 Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) at 1071.
212 Id.; see also Roach, supra note 206, at 53-54 ("Declarations can work in cases in which
governments have been inattentive to rights, but the stronger relief of injunctions accompanied
with judicial retention of supervisory jurisdiction may be appropriate in those cases where
governments are either unwilling or simply incompetent to provide socio-economic rights.").213 See Ray, supra note 9, at 181-84. In the first case, the court ordered the City to report
back to the court within four months to deliver a report on the steps it took to comply with its
constitutional obligations to make provisions for emergency housing. See City of Cape Town v
Rudolph & Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) (S. Afr.). In the second case, the court held that the city
could not evict residents of an informal settlement until it had implemented the Grootboom
decision and developed a plan to accommodate residents of an informal settlement. See In the
Matter Between the City of Cape Town & the Various Occupiers of the Road Reserve of
Appellant Parallel to the Sheffield Road in Phillipi, No. A 5/2003 (Sept. 30, 2003) (S. Afr.); see
also Liebenberg, supra note 118, at 98 (noting that the "High Courts have generally granted
supervisory orders more readily" than the Constitutional Court).
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require a reasonable justification for policy choices may encourage
the government to pay greater attention to developing robust policies
and devoting sufficient resources to socio-economic rights. Further,
requiring the government to prove that its policies are reasonable
in court may increase the transparency of the government's
decision-making process. As Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm have
written, courts can serve as a catalyst for elaborating norms and
engaging relevant actors.214
The dialogue between the court and the government initiated by
declaratory relief that may evolve into stronger forms of judicial
intervention has been described as a "dialogic" 215 form of judicial
review. Other commentors have described this type of judicial review
as "policentric" because it involves "a sharing of interpretative
authority with the legislative and executive branches."2 16 Scholars
argue that such forms of review are more appropriate for enforcement
of economic and social rights than traditional juricentric models.
By requiring the active engagement of the political branches, the
dialogic and policentric approaches increase institutional competence,
democratic legitimacy, and the likelihood of robust enforcement. 2 17
Further, a public dialogue between the court and the government
creates openings for the involvement and mobilization of civil
society, building public support and political pressure for change.
Thus, while a strictly judicial legal response may result in a faster
legal resolution, engaging the government and civil society in
developing a solution may ultimately be a more effective mechanism
for meaningful long-term change.218
m. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
State constitutions share many characteristics with the federal
constitution-they set up the basic structure of government, lay out
214 See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in
New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 566 (2007).
215 See Roach, supra note 206, at 51-52
216 Ray, supra note 9, at 153-54.
217 See id. at 172-74 (investigating the comparative advantages of the policentric approach
in the different branches of government); see also Roach, supra note 206, at 52 (arguing that
the dialogic approach aims to "promote healthy partnerships between courts and governments
and . .. [is] often concerned with producing systemic reforms to prevent violations in the future"
(footnote omitted)).
218 See Ray, supra note 9, at 177 (comparing the differences between legal and political
responses to social and economic questions).
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governmental responsibilities, and protect individual rights.219
However, state constitutions can be very different, both from the
federal Constitution and from each other, in the scope of their
commands and grants. Many state constitutions reflect the time at
which they were adopted and embody the unique values of their
framers and state.220 While the federal Constitution gives specific
enumerated powers to the federal government, states are viewed as
having plenary power over the health, safety and welfare of their
people and state constitutions are normally viewed as limiting those
powers.221 Both the federal Constitution and state constitutions
protect rights from government infringement and serve as a blueprint
for government action, but many state constitutions include a
broader array of individual rights, including socio-economic rights
provisions. This Part will discuss these differences with a view
toward encouraging advocates to look to their state constitutions for
protections of human rights, particularly the right to health.
In 1977, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, who
formerly served on the New Jersey Supreme Court, authored a
seminal article exhorting legal advocates to use state courts and state
constitutions to advance and protect individual rights.2 22 Justice
Brennan wrote that state courts have used state constitutions to
protect individual rights at a variety of junctures in U.S. history, but
that state constitutions essentially faded into the background "during
219 Compare U.S. CONST., with N.J. CONST., and W. VA. CONST.
220 See, e.g., Jon Lauck, "The Organic Law of a Great Commonwealth": The Framing of
the South Dakota Constitution, 53 S.D. L. REV. 203, 219-24 (2008) (describing the historical
context and influences on the framing of the South Dakota Constitution); Charles W. Johnson
& Scott P. Beetham, The Origin of Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution,
31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 431, 434-56 (2008) (discussing the protections against search and
seizure in the Washington Constitution as developing in reaction to framers' disagreement with
then-recent federal court jurisprudence on that issue).
221 See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1180
(1992) (describing early views of states' constitutional limits on plenary powers); George T.
Anagnost, The Arizona Constitution: Sources, Structure & Interpretive Cases, ARIZ. ATr'Y
MAG., Mar. 2009, at 14, 15 (noting that state constitutions "recite both open-ended powers and
concomitant limitations"); see also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1982)
("[S]tate Constitutions are separate sources of individual freedoms and restrictions on the
exercise of power by the Legislature. By contrast, the U.S. Constitution is a grant of enumerated
powers to the federal government. Thus, in appropriate cases, the individual states may accord
greater respect than the federal government to certain fundamental rights. Although the state
Constitution may encompass a smaller universe than the federal Constitution, our constellation
of rights may be more complete." (citations omitted)); Gangemi v. Berry, 134 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J.
1957) ("The government of the United States is one of enumerated powers; and in its very
nature the State Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of the exercise of the sovereign
power inherent in the people, subject to the limitations imposed by the grant to the general
government and, as well, those so fundamental in the social compact as to be necessarily
implied.").
222 See Brennan, supra note 1.
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the 1960's [when] our rights and liberties were in the process of
becoming increasingly federalized."223 Justice Brennan "pointed out
that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution considered state
constitutions, rather than the federal Constitution, to provide the
principal legal bulwark for individual liberties," and observed that
many individual rights were protected more fully by state
constitutions. 224
While Justice Brennan appeared most concerned with reversals
and narrowing of decisions relating to significant federal individual
constitutional rights found in the United States Constitution
and therefore urged state advocates to look to their own state
constitutions' protection of those same rights,22 5 state constitutions
often contain affirmative guarantees of social and economic rights
that are not contained in their federal counterpart. In the three decades
since Justice Brennan's article, a rich scholarship has developed that
identifies the possibilities for vindicating state constitutional rights
beyond those that mirror federal individual rights.226 Yet despite the
2 23 Id. at 495; see also Daniel Gordon, Brennan's State Constitutional Era Twenty-Five
Years Later-The History, The Present, and the State Constitutional Wall, 73 TEMP. L. REV.
1031, 1047 (2000) ("According to Brennan, state law came and went, and federal law came
and stalled. ... Federal constitutional and state constitutional law both served alternatively like
dominant and recessive genes to control the growth of individual rights.").
224 Clint Bolick, Brennan's Epiphany: The Necessity of Invoking State Constitutions to
Protect Freedom, 12 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 137, 140 (2007).
225 See id. (describing Brennan's concerns about the Supreme Court's retreat from
protecting individual constitutional rights); see also Bolick, supra note 224, at 140 (discussing
the federal judiciary's increasingly limited reading of certain federal constitutional rights as
compared with state interpretations of identical state constitutional provisions that created
notably broader protections for the same rights).
226 See, e.g., Jason J. Czarneski, Environmentalism and the Wisconsin Constitution, 90
MARQ. L. REV. 465 (2007); Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and
International Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359 (2006); Anna Maria
Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating International Human
Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 139 (2006); Helen Hershkoff, Essay,
Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1403 (1999); Helen
Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7 (1993)
[hereinafter Hershkoff, State Constitutions]; Risa E. Kaufman, State ERAs in the New Era:
Securing Poor Women's Equality by Eliminating Reproductive-Based Discrimination, 24 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (2001); April Land, Children in Poverty: In Search of State and Federal
Constitutional Protections in the Wake of Welfare "Reforms," 2000 UTAH L. REV. 779; Burt
Neuborne, Foreword, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J.
881 (1989); James M. Scott III, Positive Rights-Right to Subsistence Under the Connecticut
Constitution, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 970 (1996); Robert A. Sedler, The State Constitutions and the
Supplemental Protection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 465 (1985); Tarr, supra note
221; Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an
Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833 (2004); Shirley S.
Abrahamson, Chief Justice, Wis. Supreme Court, State Constitutional Law, New Judicial
Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court, Address at the Cleveland State Law Review Symposium:
The Ohio Constitution-Then and Now: An Examination of the Law and History of the Ohio
Constitution on the Occasion of Its Bicentennial (2004), in 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339 (2004);
Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, "Wise Parents Do Not
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wealth. of opportunities for advancing socio-economic rights under
these state constitutions, practitioners and advocates have continued
to focus on federal courts as the best forums to vindicate individual
rights. As Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit noted in a recent essay, law schools are part of
the problem. 2 27 Law schools almost never teach state constitutional
law, leaving most lawyers without any familiarity with their own or
any other state constitution, much less the potential for using state
constitutions to advance individual rights.22 8 Moreover, a certain
skepticism exists about the potential for state courts to adequately
address serious constitutional violations and deprivations. 2 29 This
skepticism has led to advocates primarily bringing individual rights
Hesitate to Learn From Their Children": Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global
Jurisprudence, Speech at the New York University School of Law Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. Lecture on State Courts and Social Justice (Feb. 9, 2004), in 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633 (2004).
22 7 See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Essay, Why Teach-And Why Study-State Constitutional Law,
34 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 165, 166 (2009) (observing that "most law schools do not teach state
constitutional law").
22 8 See id. at 166-67 (noting that no law school offers state constitutional law as "a core
part of its curriculum," that in 2007-2008, only eighty law schools taught courses that even
touched on state constitutional law, and that "[n]ot one of the top fifteen law schools . . .
offered" any general state constitutional or state government law course); see also A Symposium
with Women Chiefs, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 305, 325 (2007) (quoting Judith Kaye, former
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, who, in discussing a speech she had given
about the New York State Constitution, recounted that "[a] lawyer came up to me afterwards,
and said, 'Judge Kaye, I feel like I am swimming in a whole new sea of culture. I didn't know
we had a State Constitution,"' and observing in response that "the fact is we have had a State
Constitution since 1777").
229 See, e.g., Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 131, 186-88 (2009) (noting the academic and jurisprudential "impasse" over
whether the "federal judiciary is institutionally and normatively superior to the state courts" and
whether federal courts "are the better forum [for constitutional adjudication] because of their
technical competence, predisposition toward enforcing constitutional rights, and independence,"
as well as some scholars' argument that "state courts are just as competent to decide federal
questions, and that courts' hospitability to federal constitutional claims is not the appropriate
measure for parity" (footnotes omitted)). Harbach observes that "the Supreme Court has offered
support for both positions." Id. at 188
Of course, much of this skepticism exists as a result of the failure on the part of some state
courts to adequately enforce civil rights in the 1950s and 60s under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and some of the more expansive federal constitutional decisions that came out of the Warren
Court during that time. See, e.g., Kenneth Katkin, "Incorporation" of the Criminal Procedure
Amendments: the View from the States, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 397, 407 n.43 (2005) ("During the era
of the Warren court, this country saw a wave of judicial activism in the Federal judiciary largely
because State courts, particularly in the Deep South, were unwilling to provide the most basic
protections to citizens of their State." (quoting People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 165 (Ill. 1984))
(Clark, J. concurring)). This Article does not argue that all state constitutions provide more
expansive protections for individual rights than does the federal Constitution-certainly the
federal floor of protections for those rights may be the best available protection in many
jurisdictions. Nonetheless, as discussed in this Article, there are some states that have gone
further.
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cases in federal court under the federal Constitution, thereby limiting
the development of state constitutional law.230
Nonetheless, the significant differences between state constitutions
and the U.S. Constitution may bear renewed attention, as advocates
and jurists continue to seek to more fully vindicate individual rights.
State constitutions have different histories, both from the U.S.
Constitution and from each other. The federal Constitution was the
product of negotiations between states with widely divergent interests
and ideological positions, resulting in a fairly narrow document that
has remained relatively stable over the years. State constitutions were
drafted in response to more localized interests and needs. As a result,
many state constitutional guarantees protect individual rights in a
more targeted and often more expansive way than their federal
analogues or contain rights "such as the right to privacy, that have no
explicit federal analogue." 231 Moreover, state constitutions are often
more malleable. While the U.S. Constitution was authored in 1787,
ratified in 1788, and has been amended only twenty-seven times, the
constitutions of the fifty states were adopted during a variety of
historical periods and may have been amended twenty times or two
hundred times.232 Each time a state constitution has been adopted or
amended, the landscape of individual rights in that state has changed.
Until 1897, when the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution slowly began to be "incorporated" against the states,2 33
state constitutions were viewed as the sole protectors of individual
234
rights against state governments. Indeed, from the beginning of the
230 See Frank B. Cross, Gay Politics and Precedents, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1186, 1196,
1212-16 (2005) (noting "[t]here is a generalized preference for the federal courts in individual
rights or civil rights litigation, including gay rights litigation" and describing some history
behind that preference); Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1129
(1977) (defending recourse to federal courts to vindicate individual rights, although recognizing
that "by assuming state court inferiority and by seeking to funnel important constitutional cases
into federal trial courts, civil liberties lawyers may be engaged in self-fulfilling prophecy which
helps perpetuate the second-class status and performance of state trial courts").
231Id. at 1172; see also Davis, supra note 226, at 372 (noting that "[m]any state
constitutions articulate rights that are not mentioned in the federal constitution, such as positive
rights to welfare, health, education and the right to work").232 See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
2 33 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 493 ("The break-through came in 1897 when the
prohibition against taking private property for public use without payment of just compensation
was held embodied in the fourteenth amendment's [due process clause] . . . . But extension of
the rest of the specific restraints was slow in coming.").23 See Dennis J. Braithwaite, An Analysis of the "Divergence Factors": A Misguided
Approach to Search And Seizure Jurisprudence Under the New Jersey Constitution, 33 Rutgers
L.J. 1, 44-45 (2001) (arguing for an approach to state constitutional interpretation that relies
first on the state constitution, as opposed to relying on the federal constitution and using the
state constitution to fill in gaps, noting the "original view that 'state constitutions are the basic
charters of individual liberties' and arguing that this "view that state constitutions are the basic
instruments that protect individual liberties did not evaporate when state courts stopped looking
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Founding period, state constitutions were viewed as the primary
protector, and potentially creator, of individual rights in the states.235
At the same time, while the U.S. Constitution does not have explicit
guarantees of social and economic rights, many state constitutions do.
These guarantees include the right to education and in some cases the
right to health, welfare, or care for the needy.236 Scholars have
discussed the rights contained in state constitutions in a number of
contexts, but many agree that the structure and purpose of state
constitutions, along with these unique guarantees, impose greater
obligations on state governments to promote fundamental rights.237
1. Structure and Purpose of State Constitutions
a. A Blueprint for Government
The Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions that states
have an "undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general
welfare."238 Perhaps as a result, state constitutions are more
comprehensive documents, operating as a blueprint for state
government. They often provide citizens of the states with more
explicitly articulated rights than the U.S. Constitution and also impose
to them to protect fundamental liberties because those liberties were federalized during the
1960's" and that "[tihe fact that the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Federal Bill of Rights to the
states, did not relieve state courts from their obligation to enforce individual liberties under the
state charter" (quoting Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of
Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707, 718 (1983))); Fitzpatrick, supra note 226, at
1835 (noting that "invocation of state constitutions to protect individual rights was in fact the
historical norm for much of the nation's existence").
2 3 5 See A Symposium with Women Chiefs, supra note 228, at 326 ("'[A]fter all, the State
Supreme Courts, the state's highest courts, were the first courts in this country to deal with
individual rights. The Federal Constitution was not implicated until modem times."' (quoting
Deborah Poritz, former Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court)). However, according
to one jurist, "the truth is that both the federal and state constitutions held little interest to
individual-rights lawyers, professors and law students for the first 100 years of our history. ...
[I]t was not until the early 1900s that constitutional litigation in general and individual-rights
litigation in particular became a significant part of the state or federal court dockets." Sutton,
supra note 227, at 170.
2 6 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VH, §§ 1, 4, 5 (education, health, welfare); MONT.
CONST. art II, § 3; (right to "clean and healthful environment); N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1, 3
(care for the needy, public health); id. art. XI, § 1 (education); WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 20
(health and morality).
27 See, e.g., Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 54; see also Braithwaite, supra note
234, at 23-45 (discussing this in the context of the New Jersey Constitution).
28 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Providing for the "health, safety, morals or welfare of its
people" are "powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.").
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much more concrete requirements on state governments to provide for
their citizens.239 As one commentator explained:
State constitutions . . . tend[] to be quite lengthy and much
more detailed. They include substantially more areas of
concern than the federal document. There is a greater
elaboration on the structure, purposes, operation, and
financing of state and local government; often exhaustive
descriptions of the power and duties of public entities,
agencies, and officials; and, usually, a broad, expanded,
state-specific expression of individual rights. 240
b. Guarantors of Individual Rights
When the United States was still forming, state constitutions were
drafted to create state governments, outline their obligations, and
enshrine protections for the rights of the citizens of the states. 24 1 Over
the course of two centuries, state constitutions have come to house a
variety of different rights and responsibilities of both the government
and the people.242 These rights sometimes even extend to protect
individuals from the actions of non-governmental actors, a concept
far outside the traditional understanding of the federal Constitution.24 3
Special articles in some state constitutions also impose specific duties
244on the state government to achieve certain policy goals. This too
differentiates state constitutions from the federal Constitution, which
gives the federal government certain powers but does not dictate how
those powers are to be used.245
2 9 See Tarr, supra note 221, at 1172.
2 Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and
Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAuL L. REv. 269, 276-77
(1994).
241 See Tarr, supra note 221, at 1170-79 (describing the creation and purposes of the state
constitutions).242 See id.; Fitzpatrick, supra note 226, at 1838-41, 1852-56.243 Tarr, supra note 221, at 1172 ("[W]hile the Federal Bill of Rights only protects against
governmental invasions of rights, some state guarantees--either expressly or implicitly-extend
protection against non-governmental violations of rights as well."); see also supra Part I.D
(discussing the obligation to protect); supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the
"horizontal application" of human rights to private actors).
24See Tarr, supra note 221, at 1177 (discussing the free public education requirement in
the New Jersey Constitution, N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, and the healthful environment guarantee in
the Illinois Constitution, ILL. CONST. art. 11, § 1).245 Id.
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c. Different Framers, Different Ideas
Often, advocates and sometimes even state courts behave as
though state constitutions are merely copies of the federal
Constitution, but this is clearly not the case. The basic framework of
many state constitutions predates the United States Constitution.24
Other state constitutions were adopted in the midst of particularly
strong social movements that influenced their framers in unique
ways.247 Just as the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted with
reference to the motivations of the framers and the historical context
of each provision, state constitutions each have unique framers and
historical contexts.248 In some cases, these situations gave rise to
provisions protecting state values completely unique to the state.
Western states' constitutions for example, have special limitations on
water usage.249 Some southern states and Hawaii protect fishing
rights.25 o In other cases, these contexts led state framers to include
guarantees that they considered important, such as the right to pursue
and obtain happiness251 even though such concepts had been
specifically rejected by the framers of the federal Bill of Rights.252
4 See Gordon, supra note 223, at 1054-55 (noting that the Vermont Supreme Court in
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), relied on the Vermont common benefits clause, VT.
CONST. ch. 1, art. 7, which was incorporated into the first Vermont Constitution in 1777); see
also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1982) ("Understanding of the
relationship between the United States Supreme Court and a state Supreme Court as interpreters
of constitutional rights begins with the recollection that the original states, including New
Jersey, and their Constitutions preceded the formation of the federal government and its
Constitution.").
2' See Lauck, supra, note 220, at 204 (describing the circumstances underlying the South
Dakota Constitution's creation); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the State
Constitutional Right to Happiness and Safety, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 5 (1997) (noting
that the Virginia Constitution was written in 1776 before the Declaration of Independence was
authored).
248 See Gordon, supra note 223, at 1055 (describing how the Vermont Supreme Court
relied in part on the "history of the American Revolution in northern New England" in
interpreting the Vermont Constitution's common benefits clause).
u
9 See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. XVII (addressing riparian and existing water rights); TEX.
CONST. art. 3, § 49-d (addressing the acquisition, storage, treatment and transportation of water).
250 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 597 (granting all persons the right to fish in the State of
Alabama); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 16 (addressing marine net fishing); HAW. CONST. art. XII, §7
(protecting "traditional and customary" rights related to the subsistence, cultural, and religious
practices of the state's native population).
251 See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. , § I ("All men and women are, by nature, free and equal,
and have certain inalienable rights-among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness."); see also Grodin, supra note 247, at 3 ("The Iowa language (sometimes with a
more extensive statement of rights) appears in the constitutions of California, Colorado, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont.").
252 Moreover, some of the language adopted by state constitutional drafters, such as a
guarantee that residents be able to "pursue and obtain happiness and safety," was explicitly
rejected by the drafters of the federal Constitution. Grodin, supra note 247, at 7-8 (discussing
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Finally, as Justice Brennan argued in his landmark article, even when
state framers used terms that were similar to those in the United
States Constitution, the historical context of the state's constitution
and its adoption, as well as changes in the state's values over time,
could lead to a different interpretation of the state provisions than that
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting
253
comparable federal provisions.
Constitutions adopted after the "Founding era" reflect the different
political landscape. For example, Arizona's constitution, adopted in
1910, is imbued with a "healthy skepticism about concentrations of
power balanced by a deep-seated optimism that government should
play an active, positive role for social betterment." 254 South Dakota's
constitution was adopted when the state was petitioning for statehood,
and it was framed by veterans of the Civil War who valued patriotism
and public service above all else.255
Other state constitutions were influenced by changes in
international mores abroad.256 Jurists in both Montana and New
Jersey have written about their state framers' reliance on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.257 In fact, former Chief
Justice James Zazzalli of the New Jersey Supreme Court has
maintained that "[t]he New Jersey Constitution in some ways is closer
to the international guarantees contained in the [UDHR] than it is to
the nation's federal law."258 In discussing the importance of human
rights in the United States, former Chief Justice Zazzalli also pointed
out that New Jersey ratified its current constitution in 1947, just one
year before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
"provided . . . expansive individual rights, such as equal rights for
state constitutions that incorporated the right to pursue and obtain happiness and safety).
25 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 502-04; see also Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 148-49
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (discussing how the concept of "natural rights" influenced the framers
of both the Due Process Clause and the Connecticut Constitution); Gordon, supra note 223, at
1050-52 (evaluating Justice Brennan's argument that state constitutions are independent sources
of protections and that federal constitutional authority only provides minimalist protections).
254 Anagnost, supra note 221, at 17.
2ss Lauck, supra note 220, at 219-21.
256 See Davis, supra note 226, at 371 ("[Slome state laws have been crafted in the shadow
of, and were thus influenced by, international agreements such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.").
251 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and
Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 26 (2004) (observing that
Montana's "human dignity" clause revealed connections to international human rights
declarations, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); James R. Zazzali,
International Human Rights: An Overview, 37 SETON HALL. L. REV. 661, 679 (2007)
(discussing the similarities between the New Jersey Constitution and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights).
25 Zazzali, supra note 257, at 679.
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women, the right to be free from discrimination, and a child's right to
a thorough and efficient education." 25 9 Drafted after more than one
hundred and fifty years of experience with the federal Constitution,
the 1947 New Jersey Constitution more fully protects individuals
within the state from both government action and inaction than does
260its federal counterpart. Chief Justice Zazzalli particularly
emphasized the right to housing, which also exists in the United
Nations Declaration. 26 1 He noted that, while the United States
Supreme Court has held that there is no right "of access to dwellings"
under the United States Constitution,262 the New Jersey Constitution
has been interpreted to protect "housing and shelter" as "necessary for
the general welfare [and that] . . . New Jersey towns must provide
their fair share of affordable housing."26 3
Similarly, a section of the Montana Constitution provides that:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the
state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall
discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or
political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social
origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.26
This provision is unique and its history is linked to the drafting of the
Puerto Rican constitution and to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.265
259 Id. at 680 (footnotes omitted).
260See id. ("As the New Jersey Constitution is written, and as [the New Jersey] Supreme
Court has interpreted it, New Jersey law often provides more protection to individuals than
federal law.").
261 See id. at 681.
2 62 Id. (citing Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)).
2 63 Id. (footnote omitted).
264 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
2 65 See Jackson, supra note 257, at 27-39 (noting that Montana's dignity clause has thus
far been used primarily to bolster the state's equal protection clause and to differentiate it from
the federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause); see also Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211,
1227, 1233 (Mont. 2009) (Nelson, J., concurring) (concurring in the court's statutory judgment
that assisted suicide was not prohibited by state law, but noting that he would also have reached
the constitutional question and held that the right to dignity is "a stand-alone, fundamental
constitutional right" and that "[u]surping a mentally competent, incurably ill individual's ability
to make end-of-life decisions and forcing that person against his will to suffer a prolonged and
excruciating deterioration is, at its core, a blatant and untenable violation of the person's
fundamental right of human dignity").
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d. Flexibility and Responsiveness: A Dual-Edged Sword
State constitutions are also amended more frequently than the
federal Constitution. Indeed, some state constitutions have been
amended more than 200 times.26 This flexibility and adaptability
could make state constitutions more responsive to changing values
and progressive developments than the federal Constitution, and
allows each state to ensure that its governing document accurately
reflects the citizens' wishes.26 7 In some cases, the simple amendment
process has led to rights-restrictive amendments-most recently in
the case of same-sex marriage 26 8-but there have also been successful
progressive movements toward liberalizing and strengthening
individual rights and limiting overreaches of state governments.269
The comparative ease with which state constitutions are and have
been amended has also meant that there are far more "framers" of
state constitutions than there are of the federal Constitution.2 70 Some
have argued that states' frequent recourse to amendment has meant
that "state constitutions are constantly changing, and the political
perspective and aims of those amending the constitution may well
differ from those of the constitution's initial ratifiers." 27 1 However,
the shift over time in a constitution's language, or even in the state's
adoption of multiple constitutions, can also be viewed as a helpful
26See James N. Westwood & Charles F. Hinkle, An Oregon Constitutional Convention?:
The Pros and Cons of a New Oregon Constitution, OR. ST. BAR BULL., May 2009, at 27,
available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09may/constitution.htm (presenting the
call for a new Oregon Constitutional Convention and noting that Oregon's constitution has been
amended 240 times since 1902). But see Fritz Synder, Professor, Univ. of Mont. Sch. of Law,
Montana's Top Document: Its Transition into the 21st Century, Address at a Ceremony
Honoring the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention (June 2009), in MONT. LAW., Aug.-Sep.
2009, at 8, 8, available at http://www.montanabar.org/associations/7l2l/August%202009%20
mt%201awyer.pdf (noting that "[s]ince [the] passage [of the Montana Constitution] in 1972,
there have been 30 amendments to it (out of 54 proposed)" and that "[tihis is the sixth lowest
number of amendments of all state constitutions-again, a sign of its basic soundness").
267 See Schlam, supra note 240, at 298-310 (discussing the interaction between an easy
constitutional amendment process and judicial independence and willingness to elaborate on
individual rights in the state constitution).
2 See John G. Culhane, Marriage, Tort, and Private Ordering: Rhetoric and Reality in
LGBT Rights, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 437, 438 n.8 (2009) (noting that, at the time the article was
drafted, twenty-seven states had adopted amendments banning same-sex marriage in their
states).
2 See Martha F. Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then And Now, 17 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 419, 432 (2008) (noting that twenty-two states have adopted equal rights
amendments in their state constitutions); see also Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort
Reform and the Overlooked Legacy of the Progressives, 39 AKRON L. REv. 943, 956-58 (2006)
(discussing Progressive Era use of state constitutional conventions to protect and expand tort
rights).
27
oSee Tarr, supra note 221, at 1184 ("For most state constitutions, unlike the Federal
Constitution, it is inaccurate to speak of the 'Founders' or even of a 'founding epoch.'").
21 Id.
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interpretive aid to see how the state framers intended to change
* 272their constitution's meaning over time. Moreover, although the
amendments often change discrete elements of the constitution,
broadening rights in one area or restricting government behavior in
another, state constitutions have in general retained their fundamental
character and content, indicating continuity of state values and
structure rather than continual change.273
Nonetheless, regular recourse to amendment creates a paradox:
state constitutions may grant broad rights to state residents or citizens,
but those rights can be taken away with greater ease than the less
expansive rights granted by the federal Constitution.274 This attribute
of state constitutionalism demonstrates its difference from federal
constitutional law and jurisprudence. State constitutionalism is a
more malleable and fluid system-the judiciary has more power to
interpret and guide state constitutional policy and rights, but state
citizens also have more power to respond when they are unhappy
with the results. 27 5 Judicial review under state constitutions may lead
to a broad vision of rights, but state voters can roll back those
interpretations if they do not believe they reflect the state values of
the day.276
In fact, the give and take of state constitutional change may be
viewed as a way to test public beliefs about individual rights. For
example, after the Hawaiian Supreme Court held that the Hawaii
Constitution protects same-sex marriage, that state's citizens amended
272 See id. at 1187-88 (using the New Jersey Constitution as an example of the changing
intent of that state's constitutional framers).
27 3 Id. at 1188; see also Kristen Ford, Column, History of Original Constitutional
Provisions in Idaho, ADVOCATE, Sept. 2002, at 30 (noting that the Idaho constitution has
existed since 1889 and that "[tihere are actually many constitutional provisions that have not
been amended one iota since" that point).
274 Fitzpatrick, supra note 226, at 1854 ("The relative ease in amending state constitutions
to overturn unpopular state constitutional decisions reveals a fundamental paradox of state
constitutional law: State constitutions are, in theory, supposed to provide fundamental rights, yet
those rights often can be overridden by majority vote.").
275 This limitation on the expansiveness of state constitutions was the subject of discussion
among several chief justices of state supreme courts in 2007. Justice Barbara Pariente of the
Florida Supreme Court noted that "[u]nfortunately, our state constitution can be amended fairly
easily by the voters and the recent trend in Florida has been that in reaction to every decision
that protects individual rights or sets a threshold that is higher than a federal provision to limit
that expansion by placing a constitutional amendment on the ballot." A Symposium with Women
Chiefs, supra note 228, at 332. She later pointed out, however, that "the people have a right to
amend their constitution, so if they do not want greater rights than provided in the United States
Constitution, that is their right." Id. at 333.
2 76 See id. at 332-33; see also Gordon, supra note 223, at 1034 (noting that while many
state courts had answered Brennan's call to interpret their constitutions independently from the
United States Constitution, "Brennan ... overestimated the effectiveness of state constitutions
in protecting individual rights" in part because of the ease with which some state constitutions
can be amended).
104320101
1044 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:4
the constitution to ban it, indicating that the public did not support
that right.277 In contrast, many state supreme courts have interpreted
their constitutions to require public funding for abortion, and none of
those states have amended their constitutions to overrule those
decisions.278 While the protection of fundamental rights should, in
theory, be isolated from the whims of public opinion, some academics
and jurists believe that, without public support, courts will refrain
from expanding individual liberties.2 79 The public's ability to amend
state constitutions also responds to arguments about the court's
legitimacy in deciding socio-economic rights cases that involve
policy decisions. And, some argue that this back and forth within and
between states over advancing individual rights may eventually result
in the overall advancement of individual rights under both state and
federal law.280
277 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23
(permitting legislature to choose to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples, adopted 1998);
Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and
Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1154-55 (2009). A similar situation arose in California in 2008.
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as
recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). However, a federal district court
struck down the California constitutional amendment as unconstitutional under the federal
Constitution, and as of this writing, the case is on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed,
No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
278 See GuTrMACHER INST., STATE FUNDING FOR ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID 1 (2010),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib SFAM.pdf (noting that thirteen
states fund abortion with Medicaid dollars under court orders).
279 See, e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and
the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 856-57 (2008) (noting that the United
States Supreme Court refrained from addressing interracial marriage until the 1960s, when
public support for the institution had become fairly widespread, while the California Supreme
Court held unconstitutional that state's bar against interracial marriage in 1948 long before there
was public support for the decision); see also Barry T. Albin, Justice, N.J. Supreme Court,
Democracy and the Uncertain Fate of Individual Rights, Address at the New Jersey Bar
Association Annual Meeting and Convention (May 13, 2009) (arguing that courts do not move
faster than public opinion in most cases, even when faced with questions about individual
liberties, and that protecting individual liberties, particularly in times of crisis, requires civil
engagement and commitment as well as judicial review). See generally William H. Rehnquist,
Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 769 (1986) (discussing the
impact of public opinion and public events on jurists, describing in detail public events during
the steel crisis in the 1950s, and concluding that "[jiudges need not and do not 'tremble before
public opinion' in the same way that elected officials may, but it would be remarkable indeed if
they were not influenced by the sort of currents of public opinion which were afoot in the Steel
Seizure Case").
280See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1397-98 (2005) (arguing that state experimentation with
"political justice" is a key first step to achieving overall advancement of rights); Sutton, supra
note 227, at 176 (arguing that engaging in individual rights litigation using state constitutional
law "may facilitate the development of federal constitutional law," and asserting that "[tihat
is the way other areas of the law traditionally have developed, be it tort, property or contract
law .. . [i]n these settings, the state courts are the vanguard-the first ones to decide whether to
embrace or reject innovative legal claims").
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B. Interpreting State Constitutions
With their unique histories, varied political and cultural contexts
and closer nexus between the law and the citizens it governs, state
constitutions may offer broader protections for individual rights than
does the more static and removed federal Constitution.2 8 1 In order to
vindicate these additional protections, state courts are often asked to
approach questions about unique state rights without much guidance
from federal courts and sometimes without guidance from any other
state court.282
1. Jurisprudential Standards in State Court
The different structure and purpose of state constitutions, as well
as the inclusion of unique positive social or economic rights within
those documents, may make it inappropriate for states to apply
the same standards of review used by federal courts.283 Some, for
example, have criticized state courts' use of federal rational basis
review.284 Federal courts use rational basis review when there is no
fundamental right at stake. It defers to legislative judgment as long as
there is some "rational" relationship between the stated purpose of
the legislation and the legislation itself. 285 However, where state
constitutions grant additional fundamental rights or where the balance
of interests seems better addressed with a different standard, there
is no reason for state courts to mechanically apply federal
jurisprudential standards. 286 Moreover, where state constitutions grant
281 Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 54, at 1138.
282 See Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246, 1249
(Mont. 1999) (recognizing that the Montana Constitution's "right to a clean and healthful
environment is a fundamental right because it is guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights found
at Article II, Section 3 of Montana's Constitution, and that any statute or rule which implicates
that right must be strictly scrutinized"); cf In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007)
(applying the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment to the rights of a biological father and mother
as against a gestational carrier).
283 Helen Hershkoff, a prominent state constitutionalism scholar, has critiqued state courts
that use federal rational basis review of state legislative acts when the state constitution in
question grants specific rights to individuals. See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 54, at
1137; see also Sutton supra note 227, at 175 (arguing that the federal standards of review may
not be the best way to assess state constitutional rights claims).
I See, e.g., Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 54, at 1137 (arguing that a state court's
use of rational basis review, which grants substantial deference to the state legislature, is
misplaced when assessing the rights of the poor).
285 Id. at 1153.
286 See id. at 1137 (arguing that "[wihen a state constitution creates a right to a
government-provided social service, the relevant judicial question should be whether a
challenged law achieves, or is at least likely to achieve, the constitutionally prescribed end, and
not, as federal rationality review would have it, whether the law is within the bounds of state
legislative power").
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exceptional rights or contain directive policy statements that require
state governments to enforce them, state courts may have an
obligation to review state action with an eye toward "ensur[ing]
that the government is doing its job and moving policy closer to
the constitutionally prescribed end."287 For example, while the
United States Supreme Court has decided that there is no federal
constitutional right to education, and therefore uses rational basis
review for government policies impacting education in the absence of
other fundamental rights,28 8 state constitutions almost uniformly
contain an explicit right to public education, which should lead courts
to review education laws with closer scrutiny.289
Even in cases where state courts interpret a right that exists in both
federal and state constitutions, they are not bound by federal
standards of review and can properly choose for themselves how best
to approach their cases. In a recent essay, Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey
Sutton noted that while the "[t]hree distinct levels of scrutiny-
rational basis, intermediate or strict-may be the best way to assess
equal-protection claims, . . . it is hardly the self-ordained way. 290In
fact, Judge Sutton has suggested that it may be more appropriate for
individual state courts to adopt standards based on state constitutional
norms rather than national ones.29 1 Some state courts have already
done this in certain contexts; for example, several states have
recognized a doctrine of "fundamental fairness" that does not exist
under federal law but gives more breadth to state constitutional rights,
including those that exist under both state and federal law.292 In
287Id. at 1138.
2 88 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
28 9 Eli Savit, Note, Can Courts Repair the Crumbling Foundation of Good Citizenship? An
Examination of Potential Legal Challenges to Social Studies Cutbacks in Public Schools, 107
MICH. L. REv. 1269, 1291 & n.139 (2009) (noting that each state constitution has a provision at
least relating to state-provided public education).
290 Sutton, supra note 227, at 175.
291 See id. at 175-76.
29 See, e.g., Oberhand v. Director, 940 A.2d 1202, 1213 (N.J. 2008) ("Our Court has
recognized that '[flundamental fairness is a doctrine that is an integral part of due process, and
is often extrapolated from or implied in other constitutional guarantees.' . . . New Jersey's
doctrine of fundamental fairness, which is encompassed within the protections of Article I,
Paragraph 1 of our State Constitution, 'serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and
arbitrary governmental action."' (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re B.B.W., 2003 MT
377N, 14, 319 Mont. 425, 14 ("Montana law recognizes that parents facing termination of
their parental rights must not be placed at an unfair disadvantage at any stage of a termination
proceeding." (citing Matter of A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1993))). This guarantee of
fundamental fairness derives from article II, section 17, of the Montana Constitution, which
guarantees that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17. Maryland law likewise recognizes a notion of fundamental
fairness. See Borchardt v. State, 786 A.2d 631, 681 (Md. 2001) (Raker, J., dissenting)
("Although this Court has generally interpreted Article 24 [of the Maryland Constitution] in pari
materia with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have interpreted it more
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addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected the three-tiered
analysis adopted by the United States Supreme Court in analyzing
state equal protection claims. Instead, when faced with a claim under
article I, paragraph I of the New Jersey Constitution, which grants
broad inalienable rights, that court uses a test that "balances the
individual or class interests with the interests put forth by the
State" and "as a result [of using this test instead, New Jersey's] ...
jurisprudence moved in a different direction."293
2. Reluctance at the State Courts
Despite some courts' willingness to use the full scope of their
authority to create jurisprudential standards to interpret state
constitutions, other state courts have been reluctant to fully enforce
unique state constitutional rights.29 4 Those state courts have preferred
to follow federal jurisprudence even in cases in which the state
295
constitution differs greatly from the federal Constitution. In other
cases, courts have simply refused to enforce affirmative rights,
looking to the federal idea of "political questions" to avoid
interpreting novel state provisions. For example, despite a clear
affirmative right to education under the Pennsylvania Constitution,296
the courts in Pennsylvania have declined to address whether the
state's educational policy meets the constitutional standard, instead
holding that "what constitutes an 'adequate' education or what funds
are 'adequate' to support such a program . . . are matters which are
exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly's powers,
broadly in instances where fundamental fairness demanded that we do so." (footnote omitted)).293 A Symposium with Women Chiefs, supra note 228, at 328 (quoting former Chief Justice
Deborah Poritz of the New Jersey Supreme Court describing that court's approach to the New
Jersey version of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d
294, 302 (N.J. 1985) (discussing New Jersey courts' use of a balancing test, rather than a
two-tier test, to analyze rights claims under the state constitution).
294 See, e.g., Atkins v. Curtis, 66 So. 2d 455, 458 (Ala. 1953) ("Section 88 of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901 makes it the duty of the legislature to require the several counties to make
adequate provision for the maintenance of the poor. Appellee points to the fact that this is a
mandatory duty. But of course there is no way to force the legislature to perform that duty,
although it has always undertaken to do so.").
2a5 See, e.g., State v. Hendricks, 258 S.E.2d 872, 877 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) ("Though the
language in the North Carolina Constitution (Article I, Sec. 20), providing in substance that any
search or seizure must be 'supported by evidence,' is markedly different from that in the federal
constitution, there is no variance between the search and seizure law of North Carolina and the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United
States.").
mSee PA. CONST. art. 111, § 14 (requiring the Pennsylvania legislature to maintain and
support a system of public education).
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and they are not subject to intervention by the judicial branch of our
government." 29 7
3. Comparative Sources for Positive Rights
One of the reasons that some scholars and jurists struggle with
the concept of enforcing affirmative rights is that there is very
little precedent to look to for guidance.2 98 However, as Shirley
Abrahamson, the former Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, has noted, "[t]he American federal system has made seasoned
comparatists of all of us." 2 99 She pointed out that every lawyer trained
in the United States has been taught the "comparative law method,
drawing upon examples and opinions from numerous states and state
courts."3 While no other state court decision can have precedential
value in a case regarding Wisconsin law, state courts often look to
other state courts' decisions for guidance. According to Judge
Abramson, there is no reason that the law of non-American
jurisdictions could not be similarly persuasive and helpful. 30 1 In fact,
she has noted that "foreign opinions could function like superstar
amicus briefs, offering otherwise unavailable viewpoints, delivered
from unique perspectives, by some of the world's leading legal
minds."302 James R. Zazzalli, former Chief Justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, has echoed the idea that comparison to other
countries' law is hardly unique to the state court system: "Indeed, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, John
Marshall, repeatedly affirmed the importance of international law
in American jurisprudence."303 In fact, it can be a reciprocal
relationship, given that "in defining the scope of free speech rights,
the European Court has relied on, and cited to, the New Jersey
Supreme Court."30
297 Marrero ex rel. Tabales v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 965-66 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1998), affd, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999).
298See, e.g., Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863,
871 (2008) ("Decisions interpreting constitutional welfare provisions are rare.").
29Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World's a Courtroom: Judging in
the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273, 285 (1997).
300 Id.
30 See id. at 286 (concluding that if American jurists and scholars explore non-American
jurisdictions with the "modest intent to borrow ideas on classifying, discussing, and solving a
particular problem, . . . we may ... find unexpected answers or new challenges to domestic
legal issues").
3
2 Id. at 287.
3 Zazzali supra note 257, at 678.
304Id. at 671 (noting that the European Court has "extensively referenced" a decision in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court "held that individuals may be entitled to free speech
protections at privately-owned shopping centers").
[Vol. 60:41048
THE FULL REALIZATION OF OUR RIGHTS
Even when state courts are willing to explore new rights in their
state constitutions and to use new standards to evaluate them, they are
faced with the challenge of how to interpret and enforce them. Some
scholars, and indeed some state jurists, have argued that the
complexity involved with enforcing guarantees of positive rights
suggests that courts should not address them.30 5 But other sources of
guidance are available, both from other states and other countries, to
help reduce this complexity and facilitate state court enforcement of
such rights. While it would be inconsistent with the aims of
affirmative state constitutional guarantees to look to the federal court
interpretations of federal constitutional provisions for guidance, state
courts should and often do look to their sister state courts to interpret
provisions found in many state constitutions.o7 Similarly, they could
look to high courts in other countries when interpreting constitutional
provisions with similar texts and purposes.
C. Existing Jurisprudence on Rights Guarantees in State
Constitutions
1. Specific Guarantees
State constitutions became a renewed focus for advocates and
jurists after Justice Brennan wrote his call to action article in 1977.
Since then, other jurists, scholars, and advocates have recognized the
opportunities in state constitutions to give content and force to the
unique state provisions that include affirmative guarantees of social
and economic rights. Among the most common of these are the right
to education, the right to assistance for the poor, and the right to
happiness and safety.308 Despite the fact that many state constitutions
contain these types of guarantees, many such rights have not been
examined by the courts. 309 Nonetheless, many scholars and some
courts have analyzed how these provisions impose obligations on the
30
s See generally Abrahamson & Fischer, supra note 299; Marshall, supra note 226;
Zazzali, supra note 257.
306 See generally sources cited supra note 305.
307 Jackson, supra note 257, at 19 (noting that "many state courts have experience with the
benefits of comparative law by looking to the interpretations of other state courts" in part
because of many jurisdictions' comparable constitutional provisions).
3 See Chia & Seo, supra note 57, at 129 ("[Sltate constitutions often include social and
economic provisions, such as the right to public education."); see also Grodin, supra note 247,
at 3 (noting that approximately thirty state constitutions provide for the right to pursue
"happiness" or "happiness and safety" within their statements of rights).
3
mSee Davis, supra note 226, at 396 ("The 'public health' provisions of . .. state
constitutions have .. . received little interpretation from the courts.").
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states and have begun to address the role of courts in enforcing
them.3 10
a. Case Study: The Right to Education
One of the reasons that "American courts have been reluctant to
recognize social and economic rights [is] because of a belief that
enforcement and protection of such rights would strain judicial
capacities."311 Federal courts have, for the most part, managed to
avoid these types of issues through use of the political question
doctrine.3 12 State courts, however, are faced with a more difficult
quandary when state constitutions squarely and explicitly guarantee
residents of their states certain affirmative rights that require
government action. The school funding cases provide the best picture
of how courts in different states have grappled with this challenge.
These cases took several forms, but at least eleven state supreme
courts have engaged with the legislatures in their states to force
some type of action.3 13 Some of these courts have merely provided
guidance, while others have ordered the state governments to enact
certain policies and provide certain specific amounts of funding.3 14
Taken together, the "education cases" present a catalogue of different
methods by which socio-economic rights claims might be brought to
state courts and how the courts might review and enforce them.
Although most state constitutions have contained a "right to
education" since their framing, litigation around education really took
off after the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that
there was a federal fundamental right to education in San Antonio
315Independent School District v. Rodriguez. In that case, the Court
was asked to determine whether a financing system for public
education in Texas, which was based upon property taxes, was
unconstitutional because it discriminated against poor residents of the
state.3 16 Appellees argued that a right to education could be derived
310 See supra note 226.
31 Sunstein, Social and Economic Guarantees, supra note 4, at 16.
312 Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
3 13 See Chia & Seo, supra note 57, at 131-36 & 131 tbl.1 (listing three states whose courts
gave the legislature guidance without articulating specific required actions, three that entered
into a "dialogue" between legislative action and judicial review of those actions, one that
applied pressure by either implicitly or explicitly indicating a deadline for a constitutionally
adequate law, and four states that required the political branches to enact specific legislation).
314 See id. at 133, 135-36.
315411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court held that education was not a fundamental right, even
though it recognized "the undisputed importance of education." Id. at 35; see also Chia & Seo,
supra note 57, at 125-26 (stating that after Rodriguez, plaintiffs initiated state court suits in
forty-five states to secure equitable funding for public education).
3 16 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16-17.
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from the need to be able to properly use the right to free speech and
the right to vote.317 The Court rejected those assertions, noting that
many other basic standards of living, such as food and shelter, are
also necessary to fully enjoy the constitutional guarantees but that
those are not constitutionally protected.318 In contrast, all fifty state
constitutions guarantee some right to education or public schools.319
In fact, the right to education has been one of the most entrenched
in state constitutions. By 1868, three-quarters of the thirty-seven
then-existing states recognized "a fundamental state constitutional
duty to provide a public-school education." 320 After Rodriguez,
litigants went to state court in many of those states to demand that
their governments fulfill those constitutional guarantees.
i. Balancing Constitutional Obligations with Reluctance to
Prescribe Policy
The education cases, sometimes called the "school funding cases,"
have posed significant institutional challenges for state courts. Courts
are faced with a violation of a constitutional right that occurs when
the government fails to take action. Ameliorating the constitutional
violation may require the court to order the government to take some
affirmative action, which generally requires the government to
expend state funds.32 ' One common thread in these cases is the
courts' efforts to balance their obligation to enforce and protect
constitutional rights with their traditional institutional reluctance to
prescribe policy. In almost all of the cases in which the courts
ultimately ordered the legislature to take specific action, that order
came years after the courts originally heard the cases and found
constitutional violations.322
3 Id. at 35.
318 Id. at 37.
319Savit, supra note 289, at 1291 (noting that while most of these state provisions are brief
and vague, each creates at least some constitutional right to education).
320 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 108 (2008).
321 See Chia & Seo, supra note 57, at 136-38 (discussing the recent situation in New York,
where educational spending reform got tied up in politics and resulted in a state court ordering
the state to provide funds to the New York City schools for operations and facilities under a
court-deternined budget).
322 See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 455-57 (N.J. 1998) (summarizing
the twenty-eight year "generational struggle" that led the court to direct the state Commissioner
of Education to address a wide range of constitutionally derived quality of education
guarantees); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 328 (N.Y. 2003) (noting
that the case did "not arrive before us on a blank slate," but began eight years prior and
was itself based on a 1982 ruling); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 874 (W. Va. 1979)
(exhaustively summarizing the history of judicial forbearance but asserting the existence of
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In Texas, for example, several school districts challenged the
state's school financing system in 1984, arguing that it violated
the state constitution's guarantee of an "efficient" education.323
Finding in favor of the school districts, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the "school finance system was not 'efficient' as required
by . . . the Texas Constitution."3 24 Nonetheless, the court postponed
the injunction issued by the lower court to give the legislature a
chance to address the problem. 3 25 A year after the decision, the
legislature passed a bill that the school districts again challenged
326
as inadequate. The court again held that the system was
"inefficient," noting that the legislature had failed to "'restructure the
system,"' 3 2 7 but again "postponed the effective date of [its injunction]
to give the Legislature time to respond." 32 8 The legislature tried a
second time, and again the Texas Supreme Court rejected its
efforts.329 Finally, six years after the original decision, the court
upheld the legislature's third attempt as constitutional.330
ii. Creating Content for the Right
The education cases demanded that courts establish both whether
the "right to education" was justiciable and what was required to
fulfill that right. Some state constitutions guarantee a particular kind
of education, such as a "thorough and efficient" education,33 1 while
"ample authority that courts will enforce constitutionally mandated education quality
standards").
32 3 See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 726 (Tex.
1995).324 1d. (citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397
(Tex. 1989)).
32 5 See Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 399.
32 6 See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 726.
327Id. (quoting Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 496
(Tex. 1991)).
32 8 Id. (citing Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 498-99).
32 9 See id. at 726-27 (citing Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood III), 826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992)).
330 See id. at 750 (holding that the new bill was "constitutional in all respects"). Similarly,
the school funding cases in New Jersey began in 1973 with a simple holding that the state's
financing system was unconstitutional because it was inequitable; twenty years later, the court
was still deeply engaged in setting forth specific requirements to meet the constitutional
threshold. Compare Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 284-86 (N.J. 1973) (allowing the state to
decide whether to assign its constitutional obligation to provide a thorough and efficient system
of education to local governments), with Abbott V, 710 A.2d 450, 456, 507-08 (N.J. 1998)
(recalling its mandate under Abbott IV "that the State provide parity funding" for poorer school
districts and requiring that "Abbott" districts provide half-day preschool). See also infra notes
346-54 and accompanying text (discussing the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration of
the constitutional school funding requirements).
33' See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV.
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others simply mention education, leaving it to the courts to untangle
its meaning. In some cases, courts have held that the guarantee itself
implies that the education must be "minimally adequate."332 While
explicating the meaning of terms in a constitution is well within the
purview of every court, these cases raised questions about when a
court is simply explaining an already existing right and when a court
is creating law or policy.333 Moreover, while all state constitutions
guarantee the right, all states also currently provide some form
of public education, leaving courts in the difficult position of
determining whether the state's efforts, normally limited by budget
and other concerns, fulfill the constitutional mandate.334 Indeed, for
this reason, some argue that courts should refrain from accepting
these cases on the basis of the political question doctrine.3 However,
other courts and scholars have insisted that the rights contained in the
state constitutions belong to the people and must be enforced,
regardless of whether they are considered negative or positive.336 In
fact, some state courts have emphasized that their role is to interpret
the constitution and to analyze whether the actions of the government
are in keeping with its requirements. The Kentucky Supreme Court
went so far as to state that it would be "literally unthinkable" for a
state court to leave such analysis to the discretion of the legislature.
One of the significant critiques of socio-economic rights is that
they lack clear parameters, lending themselves better to policy
resolutions than judicial orders.338 An important lesson to be gleaned
332 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 330-32 (N.Y.
2003) (articulating the "minimally adequate" requirement for a sound basic education in New
York). This approach is similar to the minimum core approach adopted by the U.N. Committee
on Economic and Social Rights. See Langford, supra note 2, at 22; supra text accompanying
note 76; see also discussion supra Part H.B.2.b.
333 See, e.g., Chia & Seo, supra note 57, at 127-28 (explaining the lack of clear boundaries
between legislative and judicial duties in the area of educational funding).
334 See generally id. at 127-30
335 See, e.g., Bess J. DuRant, The Political Question Doctrine: A Doctrine for Long-Term
Change in Our Public Schools, 59 S.C. L. REv. 531, 535-43 (2008) (criticizing the state courts'
decisions in school funding cases and arguing the courts are not designed to effectively address
such issues).
336 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. See generally Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
1), 495 A.2d 376, 382 (N.J. 1985) (discussing the possible severity of legislative inaction
threatening rights such as education); Hershkoff, State Constitutions, supra note 226, at 24
(arguing that state constitutions are a means to secure civil rights and liberties in state courts); A
Symposium with Women Chiefs, supra note 228, at 325-26 (arguing people should do their
"homework" and alert the courts if they believe judicial interpretations of a state constitution are
incorrect).
337 See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1325, 1340 (1992) (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989)).
338 See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 54, at 1179-82 (addressing critics who
believe courts are unable to create manageable standards for welfare rights).
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from the state education funding cases is that, when faced with a
constitutional challenge based on a state-granted constitutional right,
state courts have effectively used their institutional knowledge and
capacity to come up with content and meaning for rights that may
have been placed in the constitution at the founding but had never
been given definition.
For example, in West Virginia, a group of parents challenged the
state's funding scheme for public schools as violating the West
Virginia Constitution's guarantee of a "thorough and efficient"
education for all children in the state.339 In determining the meaning
of "thorough and efficient" and what those words obligated the state
to provide, the West Virginia Supreme Court relied on "dictionary
definitions current at the time [the West Virginia Constitution was
written] and those now extant; pronouncements by courts; reliable
extra-judicial commentary; and definitions set or inferable from
debates and proceedings of the bodies" that created the state's
constitution.' With those resources as the basis, the court concluded
that "a thorough and efficient system of schools . . . develops, as best
the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social
morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy
occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically."34 1
The court went further to add that from this definition stemmed a
legal obligation on the part of the state to, among other things,
develop[] in every child to his or her capacity of (1) literacy;
(2) ability to add, subtract, multiply and divide numbers;
[and] (3) knowledge of government to the extent that
the child will be equipped as a citizen to make informed
choices among persons and issues that affect his own
governance .... 342
The court ultimately remanded the case for a trial on the merits, but
gave direction to the lower court on how to conduct that trial and the
types of evidence that might be necessary. 4 3 In doing so, the court
pointed out that "great weight will be given to legislatively
established standards," but also noted that the constitution "requires
the development of certain high quality educational standards,
and that it is in part by these quality standards that the existing
339 See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
MId. at 874.
31 Id. at 877.
342 Id.
3 See id. at 878-83 (examining the various education statutes in West Virginia and
developing lines of inquiry for consideration on remand).
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educational system must be tested."3 4 The court added that in order
to allow the legislative branch the appropriate level of involvement in
the case, the trial court needed to add the leaders of the legislative
branch as parties, essentially to give them the opportunity to present
their arguments about what should meet the standard.345
In New Jersey, the courts were similarly asked to determine the
requirements for a "thorough and efficient education" under their
state constitution. 346 In 1973, the New Jersey Supreme Court began
with the simple question whether a state educational financing system
based primarily on local funding could satisfy its constitutional
requirement. 347 The court concluded it could not, but did not direct the
state to provide any other particular system.348 Instead, it held that the
state must propose its own solutions and set the issue for future
argument. 34 9 Twenty years and multiple court cases later, the New
Jersey Supreme Court changed course and began mandating specific
standards. First, it held that "[a] thorough and efficient education
requires such level of education as will enable all students to function
as citizens and workers in the same society," and went further to hold
that in order to bring poorer students up to this standard, the state
must add "something more . . . to the regular education" system.350 in
1990, after reviewing the legislature's attempt to address these
inequalities, the court again struck down the legislature's financing
scheme and held that "in order to provide a thorough and efficient
education in these poorer urban districts, the State must assure that
their educational expenditures per pupil are substantially equivalent to
those of the more affluent suburban districts, and that, in addition,
their special disadvantages must be addressed." 3 51 By 1998, in a
decision that the court hoped would "be the last major judicial
involvement in the long and tortuous history of the State's
extraordinary effort to bring a thorough and efficient education to the
children in its poorest school districts,"352 the court required the
state's Department of Education to provide preschool for three
and four year olds in the underprivileged school districts that had
3"Id. at 878
345 See id. at 883 (requiring the trial court, on remand, to add the Speaker of the House of
Delegates and the President of the Senate of West Virginia as defendants).
6 See Abbott 1, 495 A.2d 376, 387-89 (N.J. 1985); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273,
291-92 (N.J. 1973).
7 See Robinson, 303 A.2d at 287.
8 See id. at 298.
9 See id.
350Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990).
3 Id. at 408.
352 Abbott V, 710 A.2d 450, 455 (1998).
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been the subject of these many court cases. 35 The court noted that
"because the absence of such early educational intervention
deleteriously undermines educational performance once the child
enters public school, the provision of pre-school education . . . has
strong constitutional underpinning." 35 4
The state courts' varied approaches to state educational funding
challenges present several key lessons, but perhaps the most
important one is also the most basic: affirmative rights in state
constitutions have meaning, and they must be treated as seriously as
other rights commonly found in the state and federal constitutions.35 5
IV. ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN STATE COURTS
Like the right to education, the right to health or language
supporting a right to health exists in many state constitutions but has
never been fully enforced. This section considers how more robust
state enforcement of the right to health could improve reproductive
health law and policy.
Failure to recognize a right to health care has enabled state
governments to ignore their obligation to promote access to health
care and in some cases to affirmatively erect barriers burdening or
preventing access to health care services. This is particularly true in
the area of reproductive health care where politics over women's
reproductive choices often trump respect for a woman's right to
access the health care she needs. Indeed, failure to recognize the right
353 Id. at 464.
3 4 Id.
355 Although there is no consensus on whether these school funding cases have been
successful in ameliorating the educational inequities that prompted the litigation in the first
place, the academic literature now largely recognizes that the cases had some positive impact on
the educational systems within those states. See, e.g., Derek Black, Unlocking The Power of
State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a Federally
Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1361 (2010) (describing state education cases
as "broaden[ing] the concept of equity to include a substantive component requiring states to
offer all students a meaningful education that would prepare each student to participate actively
in society"); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for
a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1671 (2007) (recognizing "positive
outcomes from school finance litigation" even while arguing that there need to be "additional
measures to address the disparities in educational opportunities," particularly between states).
Professor William S. Koski, who rejects the question of whether judicial involvement is
appropriate in the education context in favor of determining how best that judicial oversight can
be exercised, recently offered an interesting take on this litigation. See William S. Koski, The
Evolving Role of the Courts in School Reform Twenty Years After Rose, 98 Ky. L.J. 789, 793
(2009). Professor Koski suggests that the new form of "judicial 'experimentalism"' seen in the
most recent iterations of these cases may be the best answer. Id. Such a model requires that
"[courts] first destabilize the institutional status quo (that has not served the needs and interests
of disadvantaged children) and work toward reform through ongoing stakeholder negotiation,
evolving measures of performance to address dynamic 'conditions on the ground,' and
transparency to the stakeholders and the public." Id.
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to health has allowed state policy makers to consistently short-change
women's interests.
Judicial enforcement of the right to health could change this
dynamic. The international community recognizes that reproductive
health is an integral aspect of the right to health,356 and that "[tihe
realization of women's right to health requires the removal of all
barriers interfering with access to health services, education and
information, including in the area of sexual and reproductive
health." Clear recognition that access to reproductive health
services is a fundamental right could impose an obligation that state
governments take women's reproductive health needs seriously, or
at the very least, refrain from affirmatively undermining women's
access to reproductive health care.
A. The Right to Health as a Negative Right
While many articles explore the positive obligations that
governments must undertake to protect civil and political rights, there
is relatively little discussion about the negative rights component of
economic and social rights. Discussions about economic and social
rights in the United States focus on the positive obligation to ensure
access and related criticisms about expense and judicial competency.
However, exploration of the negative aspect of the right to health
may be helpful in the context of reproductive rights where state
governments are increasingly erecting roadblocks in the way of
women's access to reproductive health services, including abortion.
As discussed above, the South African Supreme Court has made
clear that the state has a negative obligation to refrain from violating
or unduly interfering with the rights to access housing and health
care. The Canadian Supreme Court has also recognized a negative
356 See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights Resolution
2003/28: The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of
Physical and Mental Health, T 6, E/CN.4/RES/2003/28 (Apr. 22, 2003) (recognizing that sexual
and reproductive health are "integral elements of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health"); ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of
Health, 14, 21, U.N. Doc. E/C.112/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment 141
(recognizing rights to maternal, child, and reproductive health, and to women's health more
generally); OHCHR & WHO, Fact Sheet No. 31: The Right to Health, at 13 (June 2008),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf (discussing sexual
and reproductive health as "a key aspect of women's right to health); see also Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18,
1979, art. 12(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) (providing that states
have an obligation to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care and
"ensure access to health care services, including those related to family planning").
357 General Comment 14, supra note 356, 1 21.
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right against government interference with an individual's ability to
access health care services. Although the Canadian Charter does not
have a right to health, the Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted
the right to "personal security, inviolability and freedom" under
Section 7 to restrict the government's ability to burden individual's
358
ability to access health services.
In Chaoulli v. Qudbec,35 9 the Canadian Supreme Court considered
a challenge to a Quebec statute that prohibited private health
insurance for services covered by the public health system.360
Appellants argued that the law deprived Quebecers of the ability to
access health care services that did not come with the waiting periods
inherent in the public health system.36 ' The majority of justices found
that the provision violated the Quebec Charter's analogue to the
Canadian Charter's personal inviolability provision. Three of the
justices also found that it violated the Canadian Charter.362
The three-justice concurrence described the harm in Chaoulli as a
"legislative scheme [that] denies people the right to access alternative
health care" 363 and the "loss of control by an individual over [his or]
her own health.36 Drawing on the court's prior decision in R. v.
Morgentaler,3 65 the justices found a violation of the right to security
of the person where people in need of health care who cannot afford
to pay for private care "have no choice but to accept the delays
imposed by the legislative scheme and the adverse physical and
psychological consequences." 366 In Morgentaler, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a law that created criminal
penalties for women who failed to obtain the authorization of a three
doctor "therapeutic abortion committee" before having an abortion.367
The court found that the delay caused by the mandatory procedures
infringed upon the right to security of the person.368 The court
rejected the government's argument that it should only consider the
3 58 Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 849, 2005 SCC 35 (Can.) (McLachlin, C.J.,
and Major & Bastarache, J.J., concurring); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 57-59, 81
(Can.).
35 [2005]I S.C.R. 791, 2005 SCC 35 (Can.).360 See id. at 806-07.
361 See id. at 807.362 See id. at 794.
3 Id. at 848 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major & Bastarache, J.J., concurring).
36 Id. at 850.
365 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).
366 Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. at 849 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major & Bastarache, J.J., concurring).
367 See Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 45.
368 See id. at 59. Section 7 provides that the state may not interfere with the security of the
person unless it conforms with the "principles of fundamental justice." Id. at 72. The court
found a section 7 violation because the procedural problems with access to abortion that led to
the delay failed to comply with the principles of fundamental justice. See id. at 70.
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purpose of the legislation and not harm caused by "administrative
inefficiency," noting that the delay resulted from the "cumbersome
operating requirements" of the law itself.369 The court added that even
if it were possible to separate the purpose of the legislation from its
administration, the unconstitutional effect of the statute alone would
be sufficient to strike it down.370
In a recent article, Professor Jessie Hill argued that Treatment
Action Campaign and Chaoulli should be understood as two cases
in which the negative health care right is "conceived as a right to
be free from state-imposed harm." 7 She writes that the "negative
right of noninterference with medical treatment decisions has already
been recognized to some extent within our own constitutional
jurisprudence" and that this negative right is "easily assimilated
into the negative structure of American constitutional rights." 37 2
Moreover, the right to protect one's health using medical care is
implicit in Supreme Court cases that have required abortion
regulations to contain an exception to protect a woman's health.373
B. State Jurisprudence on the Right to Health in the Abortion Context
Professor Hill's article focuses on the Supreme Court's implicit
recognition of a limited right to health as part of the guarantee of
personal liberty under the United States Constitution.374 In the context
of state constitutional law, however, some state courts have gone even
further, expressly recognizing that their state constitutions either
explicitly or implicitly protect individuals' ability to protect their own
health. These cases do not always fit within the negative/positive
rights framework, instead incorporating elements of each. Court
decisions from Connecticut, New Jersey, and Montana provide three
clear examples.
In Connecticut and New Jersey, cases recognizing a right to health
involved challenges to state prohibitions on funding for medically
necessary abortions except in situations where the abortion would be
necessary to save the pregnant woman's life.375 A Connecticut state
369Id. at 62.
370 See id.
371 Hill, supra note 4, at 527.
372 Id. at 530.
373 See id. at 532 (finding that this right applies even after viability).
37 4 See id. at 503, 506-10 (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence on abortion implies a
negative right to health).
37 5 See Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding that restrictions
on Medicaid payments for abortions necessary to save the mother's life exceeded statutory
authority and were unconstitutional); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1982)
(finding that once the state made the decision to provide medical funding for pregnancy, the
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court struck down the funding prohibition on statutory and
constitutional grounds.37 6 It held that the state constitution's right to
privacy encompassed three "fundamental rights ... the right to secure
an abortion, the right to preserve one's health, and the right to
maintain the patient-physician relationship,"317 and found that the
regulation violated the right to privacy in all respects.378 Further, in
recognition of the importance of the right to make decisions necessary
to preserve and protect one's health, the court suggested that even if
the right was not covered by the right to privacy, it "stands in a
separate category as a fundamental right protected by the state
constitution." 3 79 Although the state argued that it was not obligated to
remove a financial burden it did not impose, the court held that when
viewed within the framework of the Connecticut Medicaid program,
the regulation nonetheless violated the constitutional right to
privacy.380
The Supreme Court of New Jersey faced a similar challenge to
an abortion funding restriction. The court held that the state
constitutional right to privacy, implied by the state constitutional
guarantees to life, liberty and the pursuit of safety and happiness, 381
barred the state from limiting abortion funding to instances where it
was necessary to save the woman's life, rather than also to preserve
her health.382 In so holding, the court stated that although the state
constitution did not contain an explicit right to health provision, "New
Jersey accords a high priority to the preservation of health."3 83 The
government could not fund services necessary for childbirth but refuse funding for medically
necessary abortions).
376 The court held that the regulation violated the women's and physicians' rights to
privacy under the state constitution and violated the women's equal protection rights under the
state's equal rights amendment. See Maher, 515 A.2d at 157, 162.
377 Id. at 151.
378 See id. at 153.
3 79 Id. at 150. The court noted that there may also be a fundamental right "to appropriate
medical treatment" in Connecticut, deriving from the "unbroken 350 years of statutory laws of
[the] state and its predecessor governments." Id. at 150 n.33. Although it was unnecessary for
the court to reach that question, the court stated that "if the right to such medical care reached
the level of being fundamental . . . failure to fund . . . medically necessary abortions would
clearly and explicitly impinge on this constitutional right." Id.
38oSee id. at 143-57. The court found it significant that the Medicaid program covered all
medically necessary services except abortions services, including birth procedures, and required
that any loans a woman received to pay for an abortion be deducted from her welfare cash
allowance. See id. at 154, 156-57.
381 See N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.
38 2 See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 932-35 (N.J. 1982).
383 Id. at 934. In a footnote, the court went even further, stating that the statute was "not
[even] rationally related to any legitimate state interest" because although the state could
rationally distinguish between nontherapuetic and medically indicated abortions in order to
forward its "legitimate interest in protecting potential life, that interest ceases to be legitimate
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court ultimately concluded that "[a] woman's right to choose to
protect her health by terminating her pregnancy outweighs the
State's asserted interest in protecting a potential life at the expense of
her health."3 84 Clearly, even while declining to guarantee the right to
health as a fundamental right, the New Jersey Supreme Court
believed that the state constitution contained strong protections for
women to act to protect their own health whether or not the state
agrees with their decisions.
The Connecticut and New Jersey cases address the states'
obligation to fund medically necessary abortions for indigent women
in instances where the state funds all other medically necessary
services, including pregnancy care. The cases hold that the states'
decision to single out some medically necessary abortions for
exclusion constitutes impermissible government interference with
women's ability to make decisions and access services to protect their
health.385 These cases have both negative and positive aspects. In
requiring the states to pay for services, the courts have enforced
positive obligations. The courts' reasons for doing so, however, are
based in part on the idea that by funding one type of healthcare but
not another, the state is burdening a woman's ability to protect her
own health; thus, a negative conception of the right to health applies
as well.
The state's negative obligation to refrain from imposing on the
right to health may also arise when it acts to burden women's access
to health services in other contexts. These regulations take many
forms, but their common purpose is to prevent women from obtaining
abortions by decreasing the accessibility of services and erecting legal
and practical obstacles in the way of women seeking abortions. Such
impositions include the adoption of laws designed to delay women's
access to abortion services and laws designed to make it more
difficult for reproductive health providers to provide abortion
386services. Despite recognition by many international and national
when the result is to deprive a woman of her right to choose to protect her life and health." Id. at
935 n.6.
3 Id. at 937.
35 See Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 151-53 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Byrne, 450 A.2d at
932-35.
386 See CTR.FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS: ABORTION PROVIDERS
FACING THREATS, RESTRICTIONS, AND HARASSMENT 46-49 (2009) [hereinafter DEFENDING
HUMAN RIGHTS] (discussing variety of laws impacting abortion patients and providers, such as
enforced waiting periods, counseling requirements and restrictions on types of facilities
permitted to provide abortion services). A right to health interpreted consistently with human
rights law would also impose an obligation to take measures to prevent threats and harassment
of women and abortion providers, which undermine women's ability to access abortions, as part
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health organizations that the right to health requires the ability to
access safe, legal abortion and other reproductive healthcare services,
states across the United States have regulated and restricted these
services to such a degree that in some places, they are barely
accessible.3 87
Abortion providers are often subjected to targeted restrictions on
abortion providers or "TRAP" laws, which require them to comply
with regulations far more complex and onerous than those imposed
on providers of similar types of healthcare services. 3 8 8 Although not
justified for health reasons and often prohibitively expensive for
providers to comply with, many states have adopted TRAP laws.389
As Professor Hill points out, "TRAP laws often have the effect, and
of the government's obligation to protect individuals from rights violations committed by
private actors. See infra Part V.C.
387See DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 386, at 15-18 (discussing the shortage of
abortion providers, and the result that some women have to travel extraordinary distances to
reach an abortion clinic); see also id. at 65 (finding that Mississippi has only one abortion clinic,
requiring some women in the state to travel for up to four hours for an abortion).
388 See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS:
AVOIDING THE "TRAP" (2003), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civic
actions.net/files/documents/pub-bp.avoidingthetrap.pdf [hereinafter AVOIDING THE "TRAP"];
National Abortion Federation, The TRAP: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers,
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs-research/publications/downloads/about-abortion/trap_1aws.pdf
(last visited Nov. 1, 2010). Courts have varied in their treatment of TRAP laws, while generally
recognizing that such laws are enacted based at least in part on state opposition to abortion
rather than concerns about safety or health. See Tucson Women's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d
531, 544-47 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down several provisions of the Arizona TRAP law as
unconstitutional, remanding for trial on other provisions, and noting that "abortion providers can
be a politically unpopular group" and that legislature may have targeted providers for
differential treatment). Compare Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 175 (4th
Cir. 2000) (upholding a TRAP law that imposed significant requirements on abortion providers,
stating that "the importance of the deeply divided societal debate over the morality of abortion
and the weight of the interests implicated by the decision to have an abortion can hardly be
overstated" and holding that "in adopting an array of regulations that treat the often relatively
simple medical procedures of abortion more seriously than other medical procedures, South
Carolina recognizes the importance of the abortion practice while yet permitting it to continue,
as protected by the Supreme Court's cases on the subject"), with Greenville, 222 F.3d at 205
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (arguing that TRAP law upheld by majority "singles out and places
additional and onerous burdens upon abortion providers which are neither justified by actual
differences nor rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting the health and
safety of women seeking first trimester abortions. Rather, 'its sheer breadth is so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that [Regulation 61-12] seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class that it affects.' The fact that Regulation 61-12 was directed towards a
politically unpopular group in the absence of any existing public health problem only bolsters
this conclusion." (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632 (1996)).
389 See, e.g., AVOIDING THE "'TRAP," supra note 388, at 2-4 (describing the requirements
that TRAP laws impose on abortion providers); see also DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 386, at 105 (noting that if a proposed Missouri law requiring all abortion providers to meet
the requirements of ambulatory surgical centers went into effect, Missouri would be left with
only one provider).
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perhaps the purpose, of increasing the cost of abortion services both
to patients and to clinics," and may even effectively shut down
abortion providers.390
In addition, abortion clinics are often the targets of protests,
violent or otherwise. At many facilities, employees face daily
harassment both at work and at home. 3 9 1 The constant physical threat
and harassment, in combination with onerous regulatory requirements
and stigma against abortion, has led to a shortage of clinics and
doctors in many states.392 Yet states often fail to take adequate steps
to protect these clinics, their workers or the patients attempting to
access the care within.393
Many states have also passed laws designed to delay women
from accessing abortion services. For example, it has become
commonplace for states to institute waiting periods before women can
obtain abortions. Twenty-five states impose such waiting periods and
several states require women to visit clinics at least two times. 3 94 In
Mississippi, this means a woman, who may live several hours away
from the state's only abortion clinic, must travel to the clinic to hear a
litany of state-mandated biased statements and then wait at least
twenty-four hours before she is permitted to return to the clinic
to obtain an abortion.395 The mandatory delay can be expensive and
burdensome for women who must twice arrange for childcare,
request time off from work, manage other personal relationships and
commitments, and, if the distance to the clinic is very far, incur the
expense and inconvenience of an overnight trip.
At least one state supreme court has relied on a state constitutional
right to health to strike down one type of restrictive abortion
legislation. The Montana Supreme Court referenced that state's right
to health in a case striking down a physician-only law that would
have prohibited any medical professional other than a physician from
performing an abortion.39 6 While the plaintiffs only argued their case
39 Hill, supra note 4, at 545-46. ("[Slome have suggested that TRAP laws are responsible
for running some abortion providers out of business, making abortions less accessible in a given
geographic area.").
391 See DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 386, at 25, 34.
3 92 See id. at 38, 55-57, 65-66, 72, 81-83, 92, 99-100 (discussing the shortage of abortion
providers in Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Texas).
393 See id. at 34 (discussing the failure of states to take measures to respond to threats and
harassment, despite possessing an obligation to do so).
394GUTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS
FOR ABORTION 1 (2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibMWPA
.pdf.
395 See DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 386, at 64.
39'See Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999). In Armstrong, a group of
healthcare providers challenged a Montana statute prohibiting physician assistants from
performing abortions, arguing that the statute violated women's constitutional right to privacy
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under the state constitution's right to privacy,397 the court went further
to address other constitutional rights that would have caused it to
reach the same conclusion. The court wrote that the Declaration of
Rights in the Montana Constitution contained "overlapping and
redundant rights and guarantees .... Thus, the rights of personal and
procreative autonomy . . . find protection in more than just [the right
to privacy]." The court further explained that "the right to seek and
obtain medical care from a chosen health care provider and to make
personal judgments affecting one's own health and bodily integrity
without government interference" is also protected by the right "to
seek safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways.
The Montana Supreme Court recognized that where the state
constitution provided a right to health that protects the "right to
seek and obtain medical care from a chosen health care provider," the
state legislature could not impose unnecessary restrictions on that
choice.4 Advocates in other states could similarly argue that "states
that have an obligation to protect the public health prevent women
from accessing important healthcare by imposing waiting periods,
under the Montana Constitution. See id. at 367. The Montana Supreme Court found that the
right to privacy under the Montana Constitution was intended to be far stronger than the right to
privacy under the federal Constitution, for a variety of reasons, including that the text is explicit
and different from the federal text and that the records of the constitutional convention showed
that the framers not only intended it to be broader than a right against search and seizure but had
specifically referenced Griswold in discussing their intentions for the provision. Id. at 373-79.
The court therefore held that:
Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution broadly guarantees each
individual the right to make medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity
and health in partnership with a chosen health care provider free from government
interference . . . [and] [m]ore narrowly, . . . that Article II, Section 10, protects a
woman's right of procreative autonomy-i.e., . . . the right to seek and to obtain ... a
pre-viability abortion, from a health care provider of her choice.
Id. at 370. The court then concluded that because the right to privacy was a fundamental right, a
court would have to apply strict scrutiny to any law burdening it to determine whether the state
had a compelling interest. See id. at 374. The court asserted that "[flew matters more directly
implicate personal autonomy and individual privacy than medical judgments affecting one's
bodily integrity and health," id. at 378, that "medical decisions affecting one's bodily integrity
and health must often and necessarily be made in partnership with a healthcare provider," id. at
380, and that "the individual typically seeks out and may consent to the most risky and intimate
invasions of body and psyche, largely upon her or his personal trust in the education, training,
experience, advice, and professional integrity of the health care provider he or she has chosen."
Id. Ultimately, the court held that the Montana had no compelling interest in preventing a
woman from being able to choose the healthcare provider of her choice to perform an abortion.
See id. at 384.39 See id. at 367.
38Id. at 383.
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TRAP laws, or biased-counseling requirements." Although few
courts in the United States have addressed such claims before, the
South African and Canadian decisions, along with Armstrong,
provide useful guidance about how to analyze these types of claims.
Even recognizing only a negative right to health should require courts
to strike down state laws that actually impede state residents from
obtaining essential healthcare.
C. Positive Rights to Health Under State Constitutions
While several state courts have recognized that an explicit right to
health or some implied right to health require the government to
refrain from coercing health care choices or burdening individuals'
ability to protect their own health, few if any courts have gone further
than that to require state governments to affirmatively protect this
right. 40 2 Professor Elizabeth Weeks Leonard has noted that while
some state constitutions "mention health expressly," either the courts
of that state or the text itself "follow the federal preference for
negative rights, declining to impose any affirmative duty on the state
or right of individuals.'A 3 However, the state education cases and
South African experience enforcing a positive right to health
discussed earlier can provide guidance to state courts asked
by litigants to give meaning to right-to-health provisions despite
institutional reluctance and challenges.
1. Other Sources ofAffirmative Health Obligations
While the majority of this section addresses how state courts might
enforce affirmative obligations under explicit state right-to-health
provisions, it is important to note at the outset that a state duty to
promote the health of its people could be found under, or supported
by, other constitutional provisions and by the general duties of state
governments. In such situations, the state duty to enforce that right
and concurrent obligation of courts to ensure that enforcement are the
same as they would be if the right were more explicit.
40 See Hill, supra note 4, at 537-47 (describing why these types of regulations would
likely be unconstitutional under a negative right to health).
4 See generally Leonard, supra note 6 (examining state constitutions and health care
rights). As noted earlier, the funding cases have positive rights aspects to them in that they
require state funding, but the cases themselves clearly state that such funding is only required
when the state funds care for continuing a pregnancy. No court has issued a decision requiring
state funding for abortion in the absence of state funding for pregnancy care or to fund health
care in general.
4 Id. at 63.
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In concluding that the state must fulfill its constitutional obligation
to provide a thorough and efficient education for all children in
the state, the West Virginia Supreme Court recognized that "public
education is a prime function of our State government." 404 As
discussed earlier, protecting the "health, safety and welfare" of its
citizens is also a "prime" role of government.405 Just as the West
Virginia and New Jersey Supreme Courts have given content to the
right to education based on how their state's citizens are intended
to benefit from that education,4 certain types of preventative and
universally required health care are necessary for citizens to be able to
live fully, and to be able to pursue happiness and safety.407
Moreover, as noted in the education cases, affirmative government
action to ensure the right to health may be required to secure other
rights. For women to achieve the equality granted by many state
constitutions' equal rights amendments, it may be necessary for those
states to affirmatively provide them with reproductive healthcare.4 08
In other states, surely, the rights of citizens to "pursu[e] and obtain[]
safety and happiness"4W must in some part depend on their ability to
"attain ... [and] maintain good health."410
2. Enforcing Right to Health Provisions
While several state courts have already recognized that the
interaction of many different state constitutional rights creates at the
very least a negative right to health,4 1' there are a handful of state
" Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (W. Va. 1979).
405 See, e.g., Parke v. Bradley, 86 So. 28, 29 (Ala. 1920) ("The prevention of disease and
the conservation of health, by all of the means known to modem science, is universally
recognized as one of the most important and imperious duties of govemment . . . ."); In re
Sonsteng, 573 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Mont. 1977) (noting that "the state . . . possesses plenary
power to make laws and regulations for the protection of public health, safety, welfare and
morals").
406 See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877 (recognizing education is necessary for "useful and
happy occupations, recreation and citizenship"); Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990)
(holding that fulfilling the constitutional right to education "requires such level of education as
will enable all students to function as citizens and workers in the same society").
0 See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 933 (N.J. 1982) (stating that a person's
right to control his or her own body trumps any competing state interest in preserving life);
Grodin, supra note 247, at 1-3.
0 See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding that the
state's Medicaid program violated Connecticut's equal rights amendment because, while
covering all of a male's medical expenses, it did not pay for a woman's therapeutic abortion).
40. Byrne, 450 A.2d at 933 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1); see also Grodin, supra note
247, at 27-34.
410 WENDY CHAVKIN ET AL., COLUMBIA UNIV. MAILMAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH,
wOMEN'S HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE REFORM: THE KEY ROLE OF COMPREHENSIVE
REPRODUCnTVE HEALTH CARE 3 (2009), available at http://www.mailmanschool.org/
facultypubs/womenshealthcarereform.pdf.
411 See Doe, 515 A.2d 134; Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999); Byrne, 450
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constitutions that go further and provide an affirmative right to health.
Some of these provisions have been explored in a tangential manner,
as in Armstrong in Montana. Several others, however, have never
been interpreted by their state courts. For example, both Alaska and
Hawaii have relatively newly created constitutions that explicitly
require the state government to act to protect and promote the public
health.4 12 Perhaps in part because of their recent vintage, these rights
have gone all but unmentioned in those states' jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, they provide significant opportunities for advocates in
those states to push for expansion of access to healthcare and full
enjoyment and enforcement of state residents' constitutional rights.
As in the state education funding cases (where states were already
providing public education) and the South African cases (where
the court assessed whether existing policies were reasonable),
enforcement of the state's affirmative obligations likely will not
require that courts order the creation of policies out of whole cloth.
Hawaii and Alaska have multiple laws addressing different aspects of
health care and departments of health designed to enforce them. 4 13
Therefore, an action to enforce the right to health in Alaska, for
example, would likely be based on the difference between what the
state is already doing and what the state constitution obligates the
state to do.
One possible right to health challenge could be a case brought by
women in Alaska to challenge whether the state's reproductive health
policies are sufficient to ensure their right to health. Just as the South
African Constitutional Court and courts in the education cases have
given content and meaning to the right to education by engaging in
dialogue with the legislature, hearing evidence from experts, and
A.2d 925.
412 See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 4 ("The legislature shall provide for the promotion and
protection of public health."); HAW. CONST. art. IX, § I ("The State shall provide for the
protection and promotion of the public health."). Notably, in Hawaii, this health provision is
located in a section of the state constitution entitled "Public Health and Welfare," and while all
nine of the other provisions in the section provide that the State "shall have the power to"
protect certain rights, the health provision is completely directive, and actually orders the state
to provide for the public health. Compare HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 1, with id. art. IV, §§ 2-10.
413 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.09.010 (2008) (establishing the Alaska Health Care
Commission, created to "provide recommendations for and foster the development of a
statewide plan to address the quality, accessibility, and availability of health care for all citizens
of the state"); id. § 18.15.355 to .395 (public health laws relating to tracking of public health
information, containment of infectious diseases, powers of department of health in public health
disasters); id. § 21.55.300 (Alaska law governing public health insurance eligibility); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 32 1-1 to 335-5 (2008) (broad range of health laws governing department of health
services, mental health, prenatal and maternal health, nutrition, and other health-related
services).
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employing other methods to gather information or research specific
issues,414 an Alaskan court faced with a challenge to its health policies
could utilize those same tools to determine the state's obligations.
Although the state might argue that the right to health is too vague,
the court could give content to the right by looking to prevailing
understandings of health at the time the constitution was drafted, as
the West Virginia Supreme Court did in the education context.4 15 In
addition, just as the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on experts in
the field of education to determine that the right to education requires
half-day preschool for three and four year olds,4 16 it also would be
necessary and appropriate for the court to consult evolved standards
and customs and opinions of experts in the field of health.
In making the case that reproductive health is an essential
component of the right to health, plaintiffs could rely on the expert
opinions of public health scholars and the World Health Organization.
A recent study by the Columbia Mailman School demonstrated that
access to comprehensive reproductive healthcare for all women is
essential "to ensure that women can attain good health, maintain it
through their reproductive years and age well." 4 17 Similarly, the WHO
has stated that access to contraception and safe abortion is essential to
protect women's health418 and that "abortion [must be] safe and
accessible to the full extent of the law."409 In fact, the WHO
recognizes that "[a]chievement of sexual and reproductive health
41 In state cases, courts have engaged special masters to research specific issues. The
South African Constitutional Court has also affirmatively sought and obtained factual
information regarding specific issues before the court. See Christiansen, supra note 36, at
378-79 ("The [South African Constitutional] Court has interpreted its control over its own
procedures to permit it to request additional information from one or both parties, to order
counsel to prepare written arguments on specific issues of interests to the justices . . . and to
make submissions related to factual disputes or relevant policy decisions.").415 See supra notes 339-45 and accompanying text.
4 16 See supra notes 346-54 and accompanying text.
417 CHAVKIN ET AL., supra note 410, at 16.418 See World Health Org., Achieving Millennium Development Goal 5: Target 5A and 5B
on Reducing Maternal Mortality and Achieving Universal Access to Reproductive Health, at 1,
WHO/RHR/09.06 (2009) [hereinafter Development Goal 5], available at http://whqlibdoc
.who.int/hq/2009/WHORHR_09.06_eng.pdf ("[S]exual and reproductive health .. . is a pillar
for supporting the overall health of communities, in particular, that of women. Ill-health from
causes related to sexuality and reproduction remains a major cause of preventable death,
disability, and suffering among women, particularly in low and middle-income countries. Apart
from ill-health consequences, poor sexual and reproductive health contributes significantly to
poverty, inhibiting affected individuals' full participation in socio-economic development.").
4 9 WORLD HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR
HEALTH SYSTEMS 16 (2003), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/92415
90343.pdf; see also CICELY MARSTON & JOHN CLELAND, DEP'T OF REPROD. HEALTH &
RESEARCH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACEPTION ON OBSTETRIC
OUTCOMES 15 (2004), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241592257.pdf
(explaining that effective family planning and access to contraception is critical to reducing
maternal mortality).
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is .. . a human rights issue" and collaborates with other organizations
on "a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening capacity in
countries to measure progress towards the achievement of universal
access to sexual and reproductive health."42 0
In order to articulate a framework for evaluating the state's health
policy, a state court, particularly one reviewing a constitution that had
been influenced by human rights law, might look to how expert
international human rights bodies have viewed the right. The U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example,
has developed criteria for fulfillment of the right to health, which
might be used as a "superstar amicus brief,'4 21 as discussed by Justice
Abrahamson, to guide a court toward an understanding of what a
state's obligations might be.
The Committee has recognized that women's health and sexual
and reproductive health are an essential part of government's
right-to-health obligations. The Committee states that the elimination
of discrimination against women in health care requires governments
to develop a comprehensive strategy "for promoting women's right to
health throughout their life span," including "policies to provide
access to a full range of high quality and affordable health
care, including sexual and reproductive [health] services.'422 The
Committee has also recognized that accessibility is an essential
element of the right to health.423 The Committee discusses
four dimensions to accessibility: non-discrimination, physical
accessibility, economic accessibility, and information accessibility. 424
Non-discrimination requires that health care be accessible to all,
"especially the most vulnerable or marginalized sections of the
population.'4 25 Physical accessibility requires that facilities and goods
and services "be within safe physical reach" for all segments of the
population.426 It also includes building access for persons with
disabilities.4 27 Economic accessibility requires that irrespective of
whether health care services are privately or publicly funded, they
must be "affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged
groups."4 2 8 Finally, informational accessibility includes "the right
420 Development Goal 5, supra note 418, at 1, 3.
421 Abrahamson & Fischer, supra note 299, at 287.
422 General Comment 14, supra note 356, 1 21.
4 23 The Committee recognizes four components: availability, accessibility, acceptability,
and quality. Id. 12.
424 See id. I 12(b).425 Id.
426 Id.
427 Id.428 Id.
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to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health
issues.'A29
Applying the Committee's criteria to enforce state right-to-health
provisions, courts could inquire whether the state recognizes
its responsibility to promote women's health and whether it has
developed reasonable policies to progressively realize that goal. The
policy should seek to provide a full range of sexual and reproductive
health services and take into account the needs of the most vulnerable
and marginalized. If state reproductive health services lag behind
other types of services or if they fail to account for the needs of poor
or disadvantaged women, plaintiffs might argue that the program is
not reasonable because it discriminates against women4 3 0 or that it
fails to take into account those in the most dire circumstances. 431
Such an analysis might require greater scrutiny of programs that
categorically exclude certain groups, including immigrants and native
populations.
In developing a reasonable policy, the state should take into
account physical barriers to accessibility and should consider the
distances women must travel to health facilities and whether there are
sufficient trained doctors and health care workers to provide services.
States should ensure that health facilities are physically accessible and
that women may safely travel to and enter them. Where women have
to travel great distances for reproductive health services, the state
should take action to make services more accessible. For services
such as abortion, for which there may be very few providers, it might
require the expansion of abortion services at state healthcare facilities.
State policies should also ensure that women have the right to seek
and receive information concerning health issues.432 States should not
fund programs that provide misleading information about sexual
and reproductive health, and should not impede women's access to
needed information. States also should ensure that women are able
to understand and communicate with medical professionals. This
might require the state to hire more translators at clinics so that
non-English-speaking women can be fully educated about their
options.
Finally, economic accessibility requires that all women are able
to afford health services.4 33 Although affordable services can be
4 29 Id. (footnote omitted).
43o See supra Part II.C.2.b.
431 See supra Part II.C.2.a.
432 Cf General Conunent 14, supra note 356, 12(b) (requiring informational accessibility
for healthcare).
433 Cf id. (requiring healthcare and services to be "affordable for all").
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provided by private health services and insurance, where the market
fails to result in affordable services, the state may have to step in.
In addition to ensuring that indigent women are eligible for state
Medicaid programs, a reasonable policy might require additional
funding for contraceptive services.
While giving content to these rights may be a multi-step process,
judicial enforcement of constitutional rights is at the core of our
system of constitutional democracy.434 Ensuring meaningful access
to reproductive health services cannot be accomplished overnight
and may require a significant expenditure of public funds. While
clearly recognizing that the state has an obligation to develop
a policy to address women's reproductive health needs, courts
should acknowledge that the obligation may need to be realized
progressively and that some degree of deference to the legislative and
executive branches may be appropriate. But the courts can play an
important role by forcing the political branches to acknowledge their
obligations to ensure the right to health, helping to define what the
right to health requires, engaging the political branches in an iterative
process to develop policy that meets constitutional standards, and
where necessary and justified by the record, requiring that the
government take certain positive steps to meet its obligations.
CONCLUSION
In order to fully enforce socioeconomic rights in our state
constitutions, state courts must address both the negative and positive
aspects the rights over time, first by preventing the state from
actively interfering with the exercise of these rights and ultimately
by encouraging or, if necessary, forcing the state to fulfill them.
Looking at the right to health, and particularly women's right to
reproductive health, it may be necessary to approach litigation with
both frameworks in mind and take the process one step at a time.
While developing this body of law may require some patience, it is
important to recognize both that states have an obligation to enforce
state constitutional rights and that state courts are not without
guidance as they face challenges in developing workable approaches
4 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989) ("The issue
before us-the constitutionality of the system of statutes that created the common schools-is
the only issue. To avoid deciding the case because of 'legislative discretion,' 'legislative
function,' etc., would be a denigration of our own constitutional duty. To allow the General
Assembly (or, in point of fact, the Executive) to decide whether its actions are constitutional is
literally unthinkable."); Fred C. Zacharias, True Confessions About the Role of lawyers in a
Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1591, 1608 (2009) (noting that in a constitutional democracy,
individual rights such as those in a bill of rights are "enforced through judicial review").
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for that enforcement. The lack of attention to socio-economic rights in
state constitutions can be attributed to a variety of factors, including
the tendency of advocates to focus on federal courts as the sole venue
for vindicating rights and the reluctance of courts of all types to
venture into new territory. However, the development of human rights
jurisprudence abroad and the emergence of a body of state law giving
content to affirmative rights have set the stage for renewed attention
to state constitutional social and economic guarantees. As Justice
Brennan said, in order for individuals in the United States to fully
enjoy all of their rights, state courts must enforce the rights found in
their own constitutions.435 Advocates can encourage the development
of a new frontier of state constitutionalism by mining state
constitutions for their potential guarantees and helping courts find the
guidance they may need from courts both at home and abroad.
435 See Brennan, supra note 1.
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